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In the years following his resignation from the Court, Chief Justice 
Warren was often asked about the case he considered to be the most 
important of his tenure. The obvious answer would have been the canonical 
Brown v. Board of Education,1 the racial equality case that defined the 
Warren Court at the time and continues to define it more than half a 
century later. Instead, as the Chief Justice wrote in his memoirs, the 
“accolade should go to the case of Baker v. Carr (1962), which was the 
progenitor of the ‘one man, one vote’ rule.”2 The case of the “one man, one 
vote rule” to which he was referring is of course, Reynolds v. Sims.3 
According to the Chief Justice, “if we had already had universal voting, 
then we wouldn’t have had many of the problems Brown attempted to 
correct.”4 Or put a different way, “Baker v. Carr made blacks a part of our 
political system.”5 Warren was of the view that racial inequality was 
directly related to political inequality. As he stated, “[m]any of our 
problems would have been solved a long time ago if everyone had the right 
to vote, and his vote counted the same as everybody else’s.”6 Moreover and 
importantly, had the Court addressed the problem of political inequality, 
the barriers to racial inequality “could have been solved through the 
political process rather than through the courts.”7 
Warren’s argument has great intuitive appeal and certainly finds some, 
though not full, support from the political process school. According to the 
political process school, substantive rights are best protected not by courts 
but by the political process.8 The role of the courts is to ensure that the 
channels of political change remain open.9 As long as the channels of the 
 
1.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2.  CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977) (discussing 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 98 (1962)). 
3.  377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
4.  Jack Slater, 1954 Revisited, EBONY MAGAZINE, May 1974, at 126. 
5.  Id. 
6.  BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 279 (1993). 
7.  JACK HARRISON POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 209 (1979). 
8.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
9.  Id. 
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political process remain open, voters can use those channels to obtain the 
substantive change they seek. 
There is no doubt that the democratic processes across the states were 
clearly blocked from the late nineteenth century to the second half of the 
twentieth century when the Court declared malapportionment 
unconstitutional. Mass migrations to the cities, coupled with refusals to 
redraw districting lines, had left state legislatures in the hands of 
entrenched political minorities with no incentive to vote themselves out of 
political power. By and large, legislative bodies did not reflect the 
ideological or partisan distribution of their constituencies. In response, 
Baker v. Carr brought the federal courts to the redistricting arena. Reynolds 
v. Sims and its companion cases revolutionized the nation. 
By many accounts, though the reapportionment revolution was 
controversial at the time, the retrospective evaluation of the Court’s 
entrance into the political thicket has been extremely positive. The one 
person, one vote principle is almost universally regarded as a central 
principle of political equality, and few today defend malapportionment. 
More tellingly, even fewer still would advocate a return to the not-so-good 
old days of yore. 
Reynolds and the apportionment cases are thus rightly lauded for 
bringing equality principles to bear on the design and composition of 
electoral structures. And for declaring and defending the principle of 
population equality, the Court has, on the whole, vindicated its decision to 
enter the political thicket. The Court’s engagement with democratic politics 
is especially justifiable if one focuses only on judicial supervision of 
malapportionment questions.10 
This aspect of Reynolds and the reapportionment cases—the obvious 
correctness of population equality and its judicial defense—is widely 
appreciated and now appears self-evident. Much has been said about 
population equality as a core democratic principle—at least core to 
democracies in the modern era—that not much more need to be said. But 
there are facets of Reynolds and the reapportionment cases that have not 
been rendered fully discernible and therefore cannot be fully appreciated. 
Reynolds and the reapportionment cases are like a Wagnerian opera. 
They contain a series of leitmotifs having to do with the role of the Court in 
democratic politics, the availability of judicial standards, the problem of 
political entrenchment, the sometimes challenge of partisanship, the vexing 
problem of race, the nature of political rights, and the like. As importantly, 
these leitmotifs are present not just in the reapportionment context but are 
the recurring themes of the Court’s involvement in regulating democratic 
 
10.  Contrast Reynolds here with Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), which was controversial at 
the time and remains so today, almost two decades hence. 
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politics. Almost all of the difficulties and pressures that are raised by the 
court-centricity of the law of democracy—indeed even the court-centricity 
itself—is a function of both the Court’s decision to enter the political 
thicket in such a muscular way and of the underlying political pathologies 
that necessitated judicial supervision. Reynolds and the reapportionment 
cases raise fundamental questions and tensions that are appendant or 
appurtenant to judicial supervision of democratic politics. There is a 
structural path-dependence to the law of democracy and we can trace the 
steps back directly to Reynolds and the apportionment cases. Though the 
law of democracy as a field and election law as an area of study have not 
come to terms with these fundamental issues, they continue to haunt us 
today. Our aim here is to make legible these fundamental questions and 
tensions posed by Reynolds and the apportionment cases by laying them 
bare. Less ambitiously, we also want to suggest, in a reductionist way, the 
lessons we ought to take now slightly more than fifty years removed from 
the Court’s most serious romp through democratic politics. 
In this Essay we revisit Reynolds v. Sims and contextualize the 
revolution that it engendered. Revisiting Reynolds enables us to see that the 
same issues that confronted the Court in 1964 continue to confront us and 
the Court to this day. Relatedly, the story of Reynolds and the themes of 
Reynolds are also the story and themes of election law as a field. As a 
framing device, we present the foundational questions and tensions 
generated from Reynolds and by extension judicial supervision of 
democratic politics as a series of dualities and dichotomies induced by the 
Court’s involvement in regulating democratic politics. Questions about the 
utility of judicial involvement in democratic politics tend to oscillate 
between the two parts of a duality. 
Consider as illustrative the initial question of whether courts ought to 
be involved in regulating democratic politics at all (or even whether courts 
ought to be involved in regulating particular sectors of democratic politics). 
A fundamental question presented by Reynolds and the reapportionment 
cases is whether the Constitution, which contains very little regarding the 
fundamental rules of democracy, authorizes the Court to say anything 
authoritative and determinative about the manner in which power is 
apportioned either between and among groups or between and among 
different institutional political actors. The Court’s tendency when 
confronted with the difficult question of whether to supervise an area of 
democratic politics is to vacillate between confessions of judicial 
impotence to remedy a supposed deficiency of the democratic process and 
professions of institutional confidence that it is uniquely suited to take on 
the pressing democratic problem du jour. Thus, this question presents a 
duality, institutional impotence versus judicial hubris or muscularity. 
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Debates over judicial supervision of democracy tend to oscillate between 
that duality. 
Similarly, there are dualities around the question of the availability of 
judicial standards, which brings up the classic rules versus standards 
debate. Moreover, election law has wrestled, since Baker and Reynolds, 
with the problem of political entrenchment and has vacillated between the 
twin impulses of trusting and distrusting political insiders, a classic agency 
problem. Additionally, as students of law and politics have recognized, 
election law sometimes struggles with discerning when is race the proper 
lens through which to view questions of democratic politics or whether 
they are viewed through another lens such as partisanship. Other dualities 
include whether political rights are individual rights or structural rights are 
individual in the nature of political rights, and when should democratic 
politics reflect populism impulses as against when should democratic 
politics reflect republican impulses. We focus on three of these dualities in 
this Essay. 
Part I provides some brief context about the state of malapportionment. 
Part II focuses on Baker v. Carr. Part III turns to Reynolds. Part IV 
explores what Reynolds and the reapportionment cases signify for 
American democracy.  
I. THE POLITICAL SETTING: A LOOK AT THE STATES 
In his 1960 study on reapportionment and state constitutions, Gordon 
Baker wrote that “[f]ew problems of state government recur so persistently 
as the apportionment of legislative representation.”11 The problem was 
acute and wide-ranging. In Alabama, for example, counties with 
populations ranging from 48,018 to 50,718 were given one state 
representative each in the state House, while counties ranging from 13,462 
to 15,286 were each awarded two state representatives.12 Similarly, in 
Tennessee, counties with populations ranging between 2,340 and 25,316 
had the same representation.13 This pattern repeated across the states. There 
was little apparent rationality in the distribution of seats in state legislatures 
and congressional delegations. The reasons were two-fold. 
First, it is important to remember the historic role played by geographic 
communities as units of representation.14 Dating back to colonial times and 
the original thirteen colonies, legislators were selected from counties (or, in 
 
11.  GORDON E. BAKER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: REAPPORTIONMENT, at vii (1960). 
12.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 n.45 (1964). 
13.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254–55 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring). 
14.  See James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State 
Constitutional Attempts To Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 900 (2006). 
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the case of New England, from towns). This approach was supported by a 
theory of representation that was inherently communal, a theory that 
recognized and reflected “the force of localism, the view that every 
community should have . . . a distinct and substantial[] voice in the state 
legislature.”15 More importantly, this was a theory that recognized 
community as borne of shared geographic closeness. According to Jim 
Gardner, this theory proceeded on the premise that 
people who live in close physical proximity inevitably share certain 
kinds of activities, and that the bonds created through these shared 
activities give rise to a community of interest that is deeply 
connected to, built upon the matrix of, even induced by, the 
particular locality in which the members live.16 
This theory ultimately gave rise to the right to geographic representation. 
The nineteenth century witnessed a switch away from county 
representation and towards districts as the units of representation. State 
senate representation moved away from geography as early as 1792 and 
“declined rapidly” after 1800.17 This switch was in direct response to 
population growth within the states. Turning to districts allowed states to 
avoid serious population inequalities across represented counties while at 
the same time containing the growth of their senate as a legislative body. In 
other words, districting provided much needed flexibility. State house 
representation also moved away from geography and towards districts, but 
half a century later. This change was motivated by the lure of population 
equality across relevant units. Under a districted plan, states could either 
divide overpopulated counties into smaller districts or else combine 
sparsely-populated counties into multicounty districts.18 Even after these 
changes, however, it remained the case that “local government units should 
be kept intact for purposes of representation.”19 
Second, the history of malapportionment is also deeply influenced by 
the Great Migration, the massive population shift that began in the 
aftermath of World War I.20 Whether caused by the industrial opportunities 
 
15.  GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL 
POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1966). Nick Stephanopoulos terms this the “theory of 
communal representation.” Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1390 (2012). 
16.  Gardner, supra note 14, at 950. 
17.  Id. at 902. 
18.  See id. at 901–02. 
19.  Id. at 914. 
20.  See JAMES R. GROSSMAN, LAND OF HOPE: CHICAGO, BLACK SOUTHERNERS, AND THE 
GREAT MIGRATION (1989); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK 
MIGRATION AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA (1992); ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER 
SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010). 
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created by the war or to escape from racial violence and oppression,21 
blacks began to leave the South and move towards the North and the West 
in record numbers.22 The numbers grew rapidly, from roughly 200,000 in 
the 1900s to 500,000 in the 1910s.23 By 1960, the number would stand at 
nearly five million blacks.24 This migration led to an obvious 
transformation in the Black population, “from rural areas in the South to 
urban areas in the North and Midwest.”25 
Crucial to our larger story is the reaction that this great migration 
engendered. As blacks moved from the rural South to the urban North, 
whites began to exit the cities and settle in the suburbs.26 Federal housing 
and highway policies played a central role in this story, favoring the 
demands and interests of middle class whites while ignoring the needs of 
the now-racialized cities.27 Violence and racism also played a role, of 
course. But the larger point is that the federal government took sides in this 
continuous flight from the cities. The story of the suburbs in the postwar 
period is a story of race and exit.28 It is an old and familiar story. 
It is easy to see how the move away from geographic representation 
coupled with the great urban migration after the First World War turned the 
Tennessee redistricting plan into a “crazy quilt.”29 The districting lines that 
the Supreme Court examined in the 1960s had been drawn long before, 
prior to the mass exodus from rural America to the cities. That fact alone 
meant that the existing districts would no longer follow a logical pattern. 
The irrationality of the plan was compounded by the use of a new metric—
population—to evaluate plans drawn on the logic of geography. This is 
what the Court did in Baker v. Carr when it compared populations between 
 
21.  See Jack Temple Kirby, The Southern Exodus, 1910–1960: A Primer for Historians, 49 J. S. 
HIST. 585, 589–90 (1983) (discussing some of the factors that led to the migration). 
22.  See DAVID A. GERBER, BLACK OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE, 1860–1915, at 470 (1976) 
(discussing the city of Cleveland and various other Ohio cities); GROSSMAN, supra note 20, at 4 
(discussing Chicago and Detroit); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930–1970, at 70, 78 Table 5.2 (1982); ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE 
MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO, 1890–1920, at 40 (1967). 
23.  See MCADAM, supra note 22, at 78 Table 5.2. 
24.  Id. 
25.  ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 205 (2003). 
26.  See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1985); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE 
WAR ON WELFARE (1989); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1994). 
27.  See KATZ, supra note 26, at 134–35; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 26, at 44–55. 
28.  See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 277, 284 
(2007) (“There is no question . . . that race played a major role in the great wave of postwar suburban 
exit.”). 
29.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (contending that 
“Tennessee’s apportionment is a crazy quilt without rational basis”). 
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counties and could not find a good reason for their gross disparities. In his 
concurring opinion, for example, Justice Douglas wrote that “a single vote 
in Moore County, Tennessee, is worth 19 votes in Hamilton County, that 
one vote in Stewart or in Chester County is worth nearly eight times a 
single vote in Shelby or Knox County.”30 Justice Frankfurter objected 
precisely on this ground, to no avail.31 Population, rather than geography, 
had become the sine qua non of representation. 
This problem was not unique to the state of Tennessee. The same was 
true in Alabama,32 Colorado,33 Maryland,34 and across the country.35 This is 
how then-Senator John F. Kennedy put it, in an essay in the New York 
Times Magazine published in 1958: 
[T]he urban majority is, politically, a minority and the rural 
minority dominates the polls. Of all the discriminations against the 
urban areas, the most fundamental and the most blatant is political: 
the apportionment of representatives in our Legislatures and (to a 
lesser extent) in Congress has been either deliberately rigged or 
shamefully ignored so as to deny the cities and their voters that full 
and fair proportionate voice in government to which they are 
entitled. The failure of our governments to respond to the problems 
of the cities reflects this basic political discrimination. . . . Our 
legislatures still represent the rural majority of half a century ago, 
not the urban majority of today.36 
This was the crux of the issue: the existing districting lines had been 
drawn long ago and remained in place in the face of mass migrations to the 
 
30.  Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court made a similar argument in Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 368 (1963), where it objected to Georgia’s county unit system because it “weigh[ed] the rural 
vote more heavily than the urban vote and . . . some small rural counties heavier than other larger rural 
counties.” Id. at 379. 
31.  See Baker, 369 U.S. at 300 (“What Tennessee illustrates is an old and still widespread 
method of representation—representation by local geographical division, only in part respective of 
population—in preference to others, others, forsooth, more appealing.”). 
32.  See Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245 (M.D. Ala. 1962). 
33.  See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 729 (1964) (“Divergences 
from population-based representation in the [state] Senate are growing continually wider, since the 
underrepresented districts in the Denver, Pueblo, and Colorado Springs metropolitan areas are rapidly 
gaining in population, while many of the overrepresented rural districts have tended to decline in 
population continuously in recent years.”). 
34.  See Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 664 (1964); Md. Comm. for 
Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d 656 (Md. 1962). 
35.  See Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
1057, 1057 (1958) (“[I]nequalities in representation are still with us and flourishing. The districts from 
which members of the forty-eight state legislatures are elected are, on the average, substantially less 
representative of population today than they were a generation ago. In congressional districts, too, 
disparities in population are increasing.”). 
36.  John F. Kennedy, The Shame of the States, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 18, 1958, at 37. 
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cities. This led to a massive underrepresentation of urban centers. 
Population disparities between districts grew to unseemly and 
unexplainable levels. More importantly for our story, it led to an even 
larger underrepresentation of suburban political power.37 Or in the words of 
J. Anthony Lukas, writing in the wake of the 1960 census, in specific 
reference to the massive population growth in the suburbs around 
Baltimore, “Maryland[] suburbanites have purchased split-level splendor at 
the price of gradual political disfranchisement.”38 
Seen this way, it is important to understand what plaintiffs were asking 
courts to do in the years prior to Baker v. Carr. They were not claiming that 
their votes had been denied, nor were they claiming that their preferred 
candidates had lost. Rather, they were making governance claims.39 As 
Pam Karlan astutely pointed out, “[t]heir real complaint is that their voice 
is diluted at the post-election process of official decision making.”40 In 
other words, plaintiffs were unable to exercise their governance rights as 
reflected in their status as the majority in their particular states. Though a 
majority, they did not have a proportional or even a fair share of their 
state’s legislative power.41 They were asking the courts to give them what 
the political process would not, but what their reading of democratic theory 
demanded. 
The Supreme Court wanted no part of this problem. As far back as 
1903, the Court made clear that it would take no part in debates over 
political rights, even if these rights involved larger constitutional questions. 
In Giles v. Harris, for example, the Court refused to stand in the way of an 
allegation that “the great mass of the white population intends to keep the 
blacks from voting.”42 According to Justices Holmes, who wrote for a 
majority of the Court, “[u]nless we are prepared to supervise the voting in 
that state by officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff 
could get from equity would be an empty form.”43 Four decades later, the 
Court similarly counseled in Colegrove v. Green that “[c]ourts ought not to 
enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to 
 
37.  See PAUL T. DAVID AND RALPH EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN 
VOTE: A STATISTICAL INVESTIGATION OF LONG-TERM TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION 
(1961). 
38.  J. Anthony Lukas, Barnyard Government in Maryland, 26 REP. 31, 31 (1962). 
39.  See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 251–52. 
40.  Id. at 251. 
41.  See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 1705, 1725 (1993). 
42.  Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903). 
43.  Id. 
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secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the 
ample powers of Congress.”44 
The problem for the reformers at the time was that the federal courts 
offered them their only chance. The political process was essentially 
foreclosed to them. The case of Tennessee is emblematic. Entrenched 
politicians had no incentive to alter the district lines and governors and 
state courts refused to intervene.45 Also, the state did not allow for initiative 
or referenda. Prospects of reform looked bleak in the mid-1950s. A three-
judge panel in Minnesota in the case of Magraw v. Donovan, however, 
reinvigorated their efforts. In the face of longstanding precedent,46 the 
panel concluded that it had jurisdiction “because of the federal 
constitutional issue asserted.”47 The panel reviewed the evidence and also 
concluded that “substantial inequality exists in the present composition of 
Minnesota legislative districts.”48 But the panel fell short of granting the 
relief requested, in order to give the state legislature an opportunity to act 
in accordance with the state constitution. It retained jurisdiction in case the 
Minnesota legislature failed to act. 
Magraw v. Donovan gave the Tennessee reformers much hope. They 
began litigation that would change the face of the nation. On November 23, 
1959, a three-judge federal district court heard arguments on Baker v. Carr. 
They denied relief to the plaintiffs a month later.49 The plaintiffs appealed. 
In the interim—November 14, 1960, to be exact—the Supreme Court 
decided Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the infamous Tuskegee gerrymander case.50 
This case presented a serious challenge to Justice Frankfurter’s theory of 
non-intervention. The facts are well known: the city of Tuskegee had a 
population of 5,397 blacks and 1,310 whites; of these, only 400 blacks and 
600 whites were qualified to vote.51 After the state legislature altered the 
boundaries of the city “from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided 
 
44.  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
45.  Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. 1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956). 
46.  See, e.g., Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959) (mem.), aff’g 179 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. 
Ind. 1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958) (mem.); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957) 
(mem.), aff’g 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956) (mem.), 
dismissing appeal from 292 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. 1956); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952) (mem.), 
dismissing appeal from 67 S.E.2d 579 (Ga. 1951); Tedesco v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 339 U.S. 
940 (1950) (mem.), dismissing appeal from 43 So. 2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 1949); MacDougall v. Green, 
335 U.S. 281 (1948) (per curiam), overruled in part by Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); 
Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947) (mem.); Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (mem.), 
aff’g 68 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ga. 1946); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (mem.), dismissing 
appeal from 68 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ga. 1946). 
47.  Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D. Minn. 1958). 
48.  Id. 
49.  Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). 
50.  Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
51.  Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 407 (M.D. Ala. 1958). 
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figure”52—or what the plaintiffs termed a “sea dragon”53—only four or five 
qualified black voters remained within the redrawn city limits.54 No white 
qualified voters were removed. 
The district court dismissed the action on the view that it had no 
authority to act.55 The court of appeals affirmed.56 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. In a post-Brown world, it seemed inconceivable that a 
state could do to its black voters what Alabama had done. And yet, this was 
a replay of not only Colegrove v. Green but also Giles v. Harris. The 
parties’ briefs to the Court drew precisely these lines. The plaintiffs argued 
that this was a deliberate violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, rather than, as in Colegrove, a case about statewide 
redistricting or the distribution of electoral power.57 They argued, further, 
that the case did not present the “delicate issue of federal-state 
relationship”58 because the state act was in clear violation of the U.S. 
Constitution. There was also no avenue of relief for the plaintiffs, as in 
Colegrove, nor was there a question about granting relief. If the Court 
struck down the new map, the old map would then take its place. The state 
responded as expected: this was a “purely political matter within the 
absolute power of the State Legislature.”59 These facts were also, as in 
Giles, “beyond the scope of traditional limits of proceedings in equity.”60 
This was the state’s way to remind the Justices that “relief from a great 
political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the state 
itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and political department 
of the government of the United States.”61 
Thus, the question for the Supreme Court—and particularly for Justice 
Frankfurter—was how to limit the Court to intervention in race cases, and 
only race cases, while at the same time ensuring that the Court will not set 
out to regulate the law of democracy writ large. Would deciding Gomillion 
open the door to Baker and redistricting questions more generally? In his 
concurring opinion in Gomillion, Judge Wisdom wrote that “Colegrove v. 
Green and South v. Peters may be distinguishable at the periphery. At the 
center these cases and the instant case are the same.”62 Solicitor General 
 
52.  Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340. 
53.  Brief for Petitioners at 4, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (No. 32), 1960 WL 
98593 at *4. 
54.  Gomillion, 167 F. Supp. at 407. 
55.  Id. at 410. 
56.  Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959) rev’d, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
57.  Brief for Petitioners at 6, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (No. 32). 
58.  Id. at 16. 
59.  Brief for Respondents at 4, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (No. 32). 
60.  Id. at 4 (citing Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903)). 
61.  Giles, 189 U.S. at 488. 
62.  Gomillion, 270 F.2d at 613 (Wisdom, J., concurring). 
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Cox similarly told the Justices that “in principle the case of Gomillion and 
Lightfoot is very similar to us. I did not see why a case should be more 
justiciable because it arose under the Fifteenth Amendment rather than the 
Fourteenth. And it does not seem to me that the . . . principle should be 
limited to racial discrimination.”63 
Justice Frankfurter disagreed. As he wrote for a unanimous Court, 
Gomillion was “wholly different” from Colegrove.64 He distinguished the 
cases on various grounds. First, Justice Frankfurter went to great lengths to 
compartmentalize Gomillion as a Fifteenth Amendment case. In his mind, 
this would remove the case “out of the so-called ‘political’ arena and into 
the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation.”65 This was a crucial 
distinction in the case and for the future of political questions more 
generally. In a communication he wrote in response to Justice Whittaker’s 
draft of a concurring opinion, which argued that the case was best 
understood as a Fourteenth Amendment case, Frankfurter argued: 
Displacing voters from Division A, where they enjoyed rights 
through the ballot which they would not enjoy in Division B, 
presents in fact a very different situation from originally making 
two divisions, A and B, and thereby placing different voters in the 
two divisions. If the situation is different in fact I know of nothing 
that precludes it from being different in law. Displacing takes 
away, deprives of, theretofore existing rights. To do so on the basis 
of race is explicitly prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment.66 
Justice Whittaker responded to this argument in a subsequent draft. He was 
not persuaded.67 
Justice Frankfurther offered three further distinctions. First, Colegrove 
arose under Article I, which gave Congress “exclusive authority” to decide 
 
63.  Oral Reargument, Part 1 at 1:39:30, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_6#reargument-1 [hereinafter Baker Oral Reargument 
Part 1]. 
64.  Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346. 
65.  Id. at 346–47. 
66.  Frankfurter Memorandum, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, Nov. 4, 1960, William J. Brennan Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, box I: 50, file 32. 
67.  See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring) (contending, in response to Justice 
Frankfurter’s insistence, that his view of the case “would not involve . . . the Colegrove problem”). 
Tellingly, he added this mention of Colegrove in response to Justice Frankfurter’s memo from a week 
before. Compare Whittaker draft opinion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot 2, Nov. 3, 1960, Brennan Papers, box 
I: 50, file 32 with Whittaker draft opinion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot 2, Nov. 11, 1960, Brennan Papers, 
box I: 50, file 32. Solicitor General Cox similarly told the Court during the second oral argument in 
Baker, “it seems to us that in principle the case of Gomillion and Lightfoot is very similar to us. I did 
not see why a case should be more justiciable because it arose under the Fifteenth Amendment rather 
than the Fourteenth.” Baker Oral Reargument Part 1, supra note 63 at 1:39:30. 
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the matter.68 Yet the same may not be said of the “discriminatory denial of 
the municipal suffrage alleged here.”69 Second, the partisan struggles in 
Colegrove “underlie so many disputes over statewide apportionment 
throughout the country.”70 The facts involved a nation-wide issue. In 
contrast, Gomillion “solely concerns state-imposed racial discrimination in 
a specific locale.”71 Finally, the remedies in each case are different. The 
plaintiffs in Gomillion were targeted due to their race, which meant that 
“familiar legal remedies are available as relief.”72 In contrast, the Illinois 
plaintiffs in Colegrove suffered discrimination through inaction. Also, 
intervention in Colegrove may result in at-large elections, which was 
contrary to congressional will. In Gomillion, however, invalidation of the 
new plan would only mean that the city would revert to its old plan.73 
But the distinctions were not as persuasive as Justice Frankfurter might 
have wished. His assurances aside, the logic of his position, and 
particularly the notion that relief for unfair redistricting must be found 
within the political process, “seemed considerably less compelling.”74 A 
week later, on November 21, the Court noted probable jurisdiction in Baker 
v. Carr.75 
II. THE COURT ENTERS THE FAMED THICKET AT LAST: BAKER V. CARR 
On June 20, 1955, the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
issued its final report to President Eisenhower on the relationship between 
the states and the national government.76 The Commission, commonly 
known as the Kestnbaum Commission, identified malapportionment as one 
of the leading reasons for the plight of the cities and the loss of “power and 
influence” by state governments.77 The Commission noted the growth of 
the cities and the representative imbalance in favor of rural areas. The long 
term goal was “an equitable system of representation that will strengthen 
State government.”78 
 
68.  Frankfurter draft opinion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot 8, Nov. 10, 1960, Earl Warren Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, box 471, file 32. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 278 (Michael Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
75.  Baker v. Carr, 364 U.S. 898 (1960) (mem). 
76.  COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR 
TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS (1955). 
77.  Id. at 38. 
78.  Id. at 39. 
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Leading voices took to the mass media to reinforce this message. 
Writing for the New York Times Magazine in 1958, then-Senator John F. 
Kennedy cited the Kestnbaum Report when assailing malapportionment as 
the “Shame of the States.”79 Months after Kennedy’s essay was published, 
the Christian Science Monitor ran a five-part series on state legislative 
malapportionment80 and a four-part series on congressional 
malapportionment the following year.81 And on the eve of Kennedy’s 
inauguration as president, on January 5, 1961, Edward R. Murrow hosted a 
CBS hour-long special entitled “Our Election Day Illusions: The Beat 
Majority.”82 The first half of the special focused on malapportionment. 
Three months later, on April 19, the Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in Baker v. Carr. Charles Rhyne immediately framed his 
argument for the plaintiffs as “an individual voting rights case.”83 He made 
this argument in response to the then-accepted position that courts had no 
power to intervene. His response was unequivocal: “there exist[s] no 
judicial no-man’s-land in connection with constitutional rights of 
individual[s under] the Fourteenth Amendment.”84 Judicial intervention 
was particularly warranted in this case because there was no other way for 
the plaintiffs to get out of this “illegal straightjacket.”85 The state legislature 
would not do it; it had not done it since 1901 and “it’s almost beyond 
question” that it would change its ways then.86 The state courts would not 
do it because to do so “would destroy the Legislature and destroy the 
government of Tennessee.”87 The governor could only ask the legislature to 
act, which Tennessee governors had done repeatedly. They had been 
ignored each time. Reformers could try to amend the state constitution, but 
passage was also unrealistic. The process required passage of the 
amendment by the state legislature, first by majority rule and then, after a 
 
79.  Kennedy, supra note 36, at 37–38. 
80.  See George B. Merry, Minority Rule: Challenge to Democracy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Oct. 2, 1958, at 13; George B. Merry, Inequities Exposed in State Voting Scales, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Oct. 6, 1958, at 15; George B. Merry, Rural-Urban Imbalance Aired in Legislatures, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 9, 1958, at 5; George B. Merry, Battles Waged to Reapportion State 
Legislatures, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 13, 1958, at 7; George B. Merry, More States Face Up to 
Reapportionment Responsibilities, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 16, 1958, at 3. 
81.  See George B. Merry, How Minorities Help Shape Congress, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 
2, 1959, at 9; George B. Merry, Rotten’ Boroughs Elect Party Chiefs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 4, 
1959, at 3; George B. Merry, Gerrymandering Lingers Across U.S., CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 13, 
1959, at 10; George B. Merry, Population Shifts Hint Redistricting, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 16, 
1959, at 10. 
82.  Our Election Day Illusions: The Beat Majority (CBS television broadcast Jan. 5, 1961). 
83.  Oral Argument Apr. 19, 1961 at 00:15, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6), 
http://oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_6#argument-1 [hereinafter Baker Oral Argument].  
84.  Id. at 01:05. 
85.  Id. at 25:45. 
86.  Id. at 19:29. 
87.  Id. at 19:47. 
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six-month period, by two-thirds vote.88 Finally, there was no initiative or 
referenda in Tennessee. In sum, the federal courts offered the last hope. 
In response, the state took the side of the law as then understood: the 
federal courts lacked jurisdiction to decide redistricting questions, which 
are essentially “political or . . . legislative question[s].”89 This was 
Colegrove v. Green. This was also Kidd v. McCanless,90 decided five years 
before. At the time of the oral argument, on April 19, 1961, this was clearly 
the best legal argument. 
In his argument on behalf of the United States, Solicitor General 
Archibald Cox took the side of the reformers. He argued for justiciability, 
and he also argued that the case raised constitutional questions that merited 
a judicial remedy. For our purposes, Solicitor General Cox’s argument is 
significant for how he frames the issue that would play a central role not 
only during the Baker litigation but also Reynolds. Time and again, he 
argued that the right in the case was “the right to be free from arbitrary 
discrimination in the exercise of the franchise which is sufficiently personal 
to give the victims of the discrimination standing to sue.”91 He repeated this 
point often. This was a case about the right “to be free from hostile or 
capricious discrimination by a state”;92 about constitutional proscriptions 
against “arbitrary and capricious distinctions affecting the right to vote.”93 
He was clear that mathematical equality in the apportionment of seats to 
both state houses “is not the Fourteenth Amendment requirement. Our 
history makes it plain . . . .”94 All the state needed to do was have a rational 
basis for its plan.95 Charles Rhyne agreed.96 
Before concluding, Solicitor General Cox made three arguments that 
counseled against dismissal of the litigation. First, this was not a difficult 
 
88.  TENN CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
89.  Oral Argument Apr. 20, 1961, at 05:15, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1960/6#reargument-1. 
90.  Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Tenn. 1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956). 
91.  Baker Oral Argument, supra note 83, at 46:01. 
92.  Id. at 52:36. 
93.  Id. at 53:11; see id. at 56:34 (“Now, I say that where the apportionment that the State has 
departs from the only ostensible basis on which the apportionment is based, by that degree—that this is 
such an egregious error that it stands on the face of it as arbitrary and capricious.”); id. at 1:14:01 (“[I]t 
should not be hard to decide whether this is or is not arbitrary and capricious . . . .”). 
94.  Id. at 55:10. 
95.  See id. at 57:10 (“Tennessee came in at the trial on the merits of this case [to] show to some 
other rational foundation for what it is done . . . .”); id. at 57:55 (“The only federal right that I’m 
speaking to is the right to have some rational basis for the apportionment . . . .”); id. at 59:30 (“[A]nd, 
so, here, if some other rational basis is pointed out at some stage of the case . . . .”); id. at 1:00:25 
(“Well, perhaps where it’s entirely irrational . . . the results don’t conform to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); id. at 1:01:29 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires a reasonable classification. And 
I suppose that means when it has something rational behind it.”). 
96.  Id. at 12:57 (“We don’t contend that you have to have the exact mathematical equality at all, 
but as near as maybe practical . . . .”). 
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case. The Tennessee Constitution provides for population as “the only 
ostensible basis for an apportionment . . . [a]nd the existing apportionment 
clearly, egregiously departs from that standard.”97 The only question for the 
courts was to decide whether the facts were “arbitrary and capricious.” On 
these facts, and absent any other standard from the Tennessee Constitution, 
“it should not be hard to decide” this question.98 Second, the wrong was 
very serious. He reminded the Court that the existing apportionment gave 
control of the state to one-third of Tennessee voters, and that some counties 
have nineteen or twenty times the vote of other counties. This was the kind 
of wrong that called for judicial involvement. “We’ve often been reminded, 
and quite right, that the ultimate safeguard of constitutional rights is a 
vigilant electorate. But where the wrong goes to the existence or 
distribution of the franchise, then the electorate can do nothing to protect 
itself.”99 This was a classic political process question, a case “where one 
can[not] look to the working of the political process to solve the violation 
of a constitutional right.”100 This was the end of the line for the reformers. 
Finally, there was no other remedy available in the state. In this vein, 
the Solicitor General urged caution. All he asked was for the Court to send 
the case back to the lower court panel for a decision. The panel would then 
go through three stages: a jurisdictional ruling; a ruling on the merits; and 
whether relief, if any, is appropriate. According to the Solicitor General, 
the state legislature took the position that “nobody [can] touch[ us].”101 All 
it would take was for the federal court to take jurisdiction, and “that in 
itself will generate great forces for a change.”102 This was key. Earlier in 
the oral argument, Cox explained that all the Court needed to do was enjoin 
all state officials connected with elections from carrying out any future 
elections under the 1901 Act. Subsequently, the Governor would call the 
legislature into a special session, where it would then “perform its 
legislative function.”103 Justice Harlan, taking a page out of Colegrove and 
Giles, immediately asked: “Supposing they don’t do that, then what will the 
Court do?”104 This was the leading reason behind the political question 
doctrine, its raison d’être.105 It is important to note where the Court was at 
the time of Baker, in 1961: in the midst of the Brown revolution, seeking to 
 
97.  Id. at 1:13:45. 
98.  Id. at 1:14:01. 
99.  Id. at 1:15:00. 
100.  Id. at 1:16:12. 
101.  See id. at 1:30:17. 
102.  Id. at 1:30:22. 
103.  Id. at 39:51. 
104.  Id. at 41:51. 
105.  See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of Democracy: Of Political Questions, 
Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1899, 1914 (2005). 
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implement the desegregation mandate. The impact of their decisions must 
have weighed heavily on the Justices’ minds. 
The Solicitor General responded that a further declaratory judgment on 
the invalidity of the 1901 Act would be enough. After that, “we certainly 
think that the Legislature would act.”106 Minutes later, he closed his portion 
of the argument along similar lines: “If the federal court takes jurisdiction, 
that in itself will generate great forces for a change.”107 This was 
unquestionably an optimistic view. Nobody could be sure of what the state 
legislature would do, in Tennessee or elsewhere. But Solicitor General Cox 
was confident about what the legislature would do. 
If the Court goes on to the merits and holds that there is a [sic] 
constitutional apportionment, I should be amazed if the Tennessee 
Legislature didn’t act. After all, the force of the principle of 
legitimacy, the solemn adjudication that there is a constitutional 
obligation carries a great effect with most of the people in this 
country.108 
At the conference the following day, on April 20, Justice Frankfurter 
argued passionately against court intervention.109 Justices Clark and Harlan 
took his side.110 On the other side stood Justices Douglas and Black, both 
of whom dissented in Colegrove, and were joined by Justice Brennan and 
the Chief Justice.111 Justice Whittaker sided with the justiciability camp but 
was unwilling to join a simple majority of five Justices. This placed the 
decision on Justice Stewart, who was not yet ready to take a side. Needing 
more time, the Court scheduled the case for reargument the following term. 
The Court so ordered a week after this first conference.112 
In the interim, Justice Frankfurter drafted a sixty-page memorandum, 
which he circulated to his colleagues the day after reargument. Justice 
Brennan responded with his own memo, which showed the arbitrary 
disparities between districts. Neither memorandum appears to have had 
much influence, at least at first. 
The Court heard the second argument on October 9, 1961.113 The 
themes were familiar ones. Early in the session, Charles Rhyne reiterated 
that the reformers were “not arguing for absolute mathematical equality 
 
106.  Baker Oral Argument, supra note 83, at 42:05. 
107.  Id. at 1:30:20. 
108.  Id. at 1:30:29. 
109.  Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 29, 30–31 
(1997). 
110.  Id. at 31. 
111.  Id. at 32. 
112.  Baker v. Carr, 366 U.S. 907, 907 (1961). 
113.  Lewis, supra note 109, at 31. 
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here. We’re saying we have a mathematical formula in the Tennessee 
Constitution. But we are asking for the reasonable equality required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”114 Moments later, when asked whether he found 
that “the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each person’s vote in the 
state be given equal weight,” his answer was simply this: “Reasonable 
equality.”115 Tom Osborn argued similarly that, on these facts, “[n]o 
rational basis can be discovered.”116 This was a common theme throughout. 
Solicitor General Cox similarly assured the Justices that states would 
retain much flexibility in the redistricting process. Judicial involvement 
need not mean that the courts must control the process. In his view, states 
“certainly would apportion and have great freedom to apportion according 
to their own theories. As we try to suggest in our brief, the job of making 
the apportionment is something which is up to the individual state 
legislature.”117 To be sure, population equality would have a role to play in 
the case. But as he underscored moments later, “ours is not a purely 
mathematical argument. We recognized that although one should start with 
equality of voting weight under our tradition that that’s not the end of the 
question.”118 This was in line with what he said during the first oral 
argument. This is the necessary question of standards. How would the 
lower courts determine when a redistricting plan violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment? The Solicitor General’s answer is illuminating, yet familiar: 
“[T]he first step is simply to inquire whether there is any rational 
justification or any coherent purpose for the discrimination or 
differentiation of something other than sheer caprice or indifference or the 
perpetuation of unjustified political power.”119 On the facts present, there 
was no justification offered—a point with which counsel for the state 
agreed,120 and of which Justice Brennan reminded his fellow Justices in a 
subsequent memorandum to the conference.121 Absent a justification, the 
judicial inquiry would end. 
During the October 13 post-argument conference, the sides held firm: 
Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark, and Whittaker (absent a fifth vote on 
the other side) on one side, Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and the Chief 
 
114.  Baker Oral Reargument Part 1, supra note 63, at 21:17. 
115.  Id. at 35:59; see also id. at 42:27 (“[T]here is no reasonable basis for the voting 
discrimination which is laid out in this complaint. And the defendants offer no justification for it and 
they cannot offer it on these facts.”). 
116.  Oral Reargument, Part 2 at 1:45:41, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960_6 [hereinafter Baker Oral Reargument Part 2]. 
117.  Baker Oral Reargument Part 1, supra note 63, at 1:32:15. 
118.  Id. at 1:38:12. 
119.  Id. at 1:13:29. 
120.  Baker Oral Reargument, Part 2, supra note 116, at 1:12:04. 
121.  Memorandum to the Conference, Baker v. Carr 1, Oct. 12, 1961, Brennan Papers, box I: 50, 
file 6. 
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Justice on the other. Of note, Justice Clark argued at the conference that he 
did not agree with the claim of the reformers that they had exhausted all 
avenues of relief. For example, they had yet to “invoke the ample powers 
of Congress.”122 The reformers had yet to make this problem a campaign 
issue.123  
Once Justice Stewart made up his mind and sided with Justice Brennan, 
the Court stood poised to reverse Colegrove. The Chief Justice then 
assigned the task of writing the opinion to Justice Brennan. On January 22, 
1962, Justice Brennan sent the first printed draft of the opinion to Justice 
Stewart. In a memorandum attached to the draft, Justice Brennan wrote the 
following note: 
You will note that I stop with the holding that the complaint states 
a justiciable cause of action of a denial of equal protection of the 
laws according to familiar equal protection criteria. As drafted it 
defers consideration of the application of those criteria and the 
matter of remedy for the determination in the first instance of the 
District Court after the proofs are in.124 
This assurance was enough for Justice Stewart, and the small majority held 
together. 
On February 2, Justice Clark wrote to Justice Brennan asking him to 
delay the case while he worked on a separate opinion in addition to Justice 
Frankfurter’s dissent. During the course of writing this opinion, however, 
Justice Clark changed his mind. As Burke Mathes, his law clerk, explained: 
In the process of writing his dissent he explored the argument that 
other remedies were available. He just concluded that there weren’t 
any. I think he surprised himself. He felt badly doing that to Justice 
Frankfurter, whom he so often joined, at that late stage. But 
afterward he felt good—felt he had done the right thing.125 
This view put Justice Clark on the side of the reformers. There was no 
reasonable way for the reformers in Tennessee to escape this legislative 
straightjacket. If the Court declined the invitation, this was the end of the 
road. 
 
122.  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
123.  THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND 
NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 848–49 (Dell Dickson ed., 2001). 
124.  Memorandum to Justice Stewart, Baker v. Carr, Jan. 22, 1962, Brennan Papers, box I: 50, 
file 6. 
125.  Telephone Interview with Burke W. Mathes, Jr., president, Cambridge Signal Technology, 
Inc. (Aug. 29, 1997), quoted in Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 29, 35 (1997). 
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Once Justice Clark changed his mind, all the pieces quickly fell into 
place. With this vote, Justice Whittaker would side with the Brennan camp 
and make it 6–3, maybe 7–2 if Justice Stewart stayed on board. In the end, 
Justice Whittaker did not figure into the final decision, and Justice Stewart 
remained with the majority, making it a 6–2 decision.126 The Court was 
coming to the political thicket at last. 
We cannot overstate the significance of Baker v. Carr. The case 
opened the door to legal questions that had long been kept out of the 
federal courts. It brought the federal courts and the federal Constitution to 
bear on questions of politics. But this was only half the question. Far more 
important was the question of judicial standards. How would the Justices 
approach these questions? More specifically, how would they choose to 
regulate questions and issues that had long been within the purview of 
political actors? How aggressive would the Justices choose to regulate 
redistricting questions and, by extension, the Law of Democracy writ 
large? 
In line with the arguments of both Solicitor General Cox and the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, the Court appeared to take a deferential approach. As 
part of the discussion of the six factors that rendered a question a “political 
question,” the Court offered the following: 
Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the 
Court to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially 
manageable standards are lacking. Judicial standards under the 
Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has 
been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that 
a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and 
capricious action.127 
This was low-level rationality review. This was a sensible way to 
approach a very sensitive topic. How to decide from among the many 
relevant considerations, from equality of population to the design of a 
stable two-party system or the balancing of urban and rural interests?128 
The Court did not enshrine any one theory of representation over any 
other,129 nor did it lay down rules for policy-makers to follow.130 Instead, 
 
126.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
127.  Id. at 226; see also id. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring) (concluding that “Tennessee’s 
apportionment is a crazy quilt without rational basis”). 
128.  See Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 42 
(1962). 
129.  See Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 467–68 (2004). 
130.  Bickel, supra note 128. 
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the Court offered to intervene only at the margins, for those extreme cases 
best understood as a “temper tantrum.”131 
Notably, Justice Douglas argued that this was a new standard, as “[w]e 
have usually said ‘invidious discrimination.’”132 And yet, he also assured us 
that “[u]niversal equality is not the test; there is room for weighting.”133 As 
the Court remanded the case to the district court to decide the case in 
accordance with its opinion, it remained to be seen what the future might 
bring. But nothing from the Court’s opinion indicated that “the heavens 
were likely to fall as a result of the ruling that the federal courts may—and 
indeed must—hear suits brought by properly qualified voters to challenge 
state legislative apportionments that allegedly denied them the equal 
protection of the laws.”134 One thing was clear: population equality would 
play a role into the future. Litigants, and the nation, could not be sure of 
how much of a role it would be. 
It remained to be seen how the state legislatures would respond to the 
Court’s pronouncement in Baker. This was clearly on the Justices’ minds. 
At the first oral argument in Baker, Solicitor General Cox assured the 
Justices that, by the end of his allotted time, the states would comply with a 
constitutional ruling: 
If the federal court takes jurisdiction, that in itself will generate 
great forces for a change. If the Court goes on to the merits and 
holds that there is an unconstitutional apportionment, I should be 
amazed if the Tennessee Legislature didn’t act. After all, the force 
of the principle of legitimacy, the solemn adjudication that there is 
a constitutional obligation carries a great effect with most of the 
people in this country.135 
The topic arose again during the second oral argument. A Justice asked 
the solicitor general: “And do you foresee . . . that all the 30 odd states . . . 
would at once say, ‘Aye, aye’, and would at once apportion according to 
your theory?”136 His response is illustrative of both how he thought the 
states would respond to the ruling in the short term and what he thought the 
Court should ask of the states: “[T]hey certainly would apportion, and have 
great freedom to apportion, according to their own theories . . . . The job of 
 
131.  Id. at 43. 
132.  Memorandum to Justice Brennan, Baker v. Carr, Jan. 31, 1962, William O. Douglas Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, box 1266, file 6. 
133.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 244–45 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
134.  Robert B. McKay, Court, Congress, and Reapportionment, 63 MICH. L. REV. 255, 257 
(1964). 
135.  Baker Oral Argument, supra note 83, at 1:30:19. 
136.  Baker Oral Reargument, Part 1, supra note 63, at 1:32:02. 
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making the apportionment is something which is up to the individual state 
legislature.”137 
The solicitor general was proven right. The reaction to the Court’s 
decision was immediate and positive, “nothing short of astonishing.”138 
“Instead of resistance or at best begrudging acceptance of a clearly stated 
principle, as had been the case with Brown, the apportionment decision 
induced an immediate, widespread, indeed eager, rush toward legislative 
and judicial implementation of a principle that may have been implicit, but 
was certainly not articulated.”139 
The case of Tennessee is illustrative. The federal district court panel 
received the mandate from the Supreme Court on April 23, 1962, four 
weeks after the Court’s decision in Baker, and scheduled a pre-trial 
conference for May 7.140 At the conference, the attorney general of 
Tennessee informed the court that the Governor of Tennessee intended to 
call a special session of the general assembly to consider the state’s 
response to the ruling.141 Three weeks later, the general assembly convened 
in special session and enacted two separate reapportionment acts, each for 
the house and senate seats. The Governor approved both acts on June 7, 
1962. 
The response from the states was nothing short of remarkable. Note 
that Tennessee legislature managed to do in the three-and-a-half months 
after the Baker decision what it had refused to do in the prior sixty-one 
years. Other states reacted similarly. By the first week of September, 
plaintiffs had brought lawsuits in at least twenty-two states.142 And by the 
end of 1962, a scant nine months after Baker, litigation had begun in thirty-
five states.143 Redistricting, according to the New York Times, was “burning 
like a prairie fire across the nation.”144 
Robert McCloskey tried to make sense of this reaction. The best he 
could surmise was “the conjecture that the Court here happened to hit upon 
what the students of public opinion might call a latent consensus.”145 The 
Court, in other words, got lucky. It caught a wave of public opinion at the 
 
137.  Id. at 1:32:15. 
138.  Robert G. McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56 
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139.  Robert B. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal 
Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 645, 645–46 (1963). 
140.  Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 343 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). 
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143.  McKay, supra note 139, at 646, 706–10 (containing an appendix that summarizes the 
litigation through 1962). 
144.  Robinson, supra note 142, at 23. 
145.  McCloskey, supra note 138, at 59. 
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proper time and rode it. But this only began the inquiry for the long-term 
regulation of the political thicket. It still remained an open question 
whether the Justices would follow the path of mathematical equality, as 
Douglas and Black had argued for many years, or whether they would 
follow the path of rationality, as the Solicitor General counseled and the 
Baker opinion assured us. This was not an easy question. What did political 
equality mean? 
The lower courts were clearly struggling with the tension between 
these two approaches. Rationality review demanded deference to the 
implied institutional competence of political actors. According to Anthony 
Lewis, for example, plaintiffs must first make a showing that the existing 
population inequality exceeded “reasonable legislative discretion.”146 Upon 
this showing, the burden would shift to the states to show that they had a 
“rational, nondiscriminatory basis”147 for the challenged plan. In contrast, 
population equality demanded a far more assertive approach from the 
courts, as well as the elevation of one principle of representation over all 
others. The two approaches could co-exist, to be sure, but not easily. 
Population equality mattered, as reflected by the many charts and figures 
used by the plaintiffs in the Baker litigation, and which were included by 
Justice Brennan in the appendix to his opinion.148 But population equality 
was only the starting point. States could deviate from population so long as 
they did so reasonably and rationally. Justice Douglas made precisely this 
point in his concurring opinion, when he remarked that “[u]niversal 
equality is not the test; there is room for weighting.”149 It remained to be 
seen how committed the Warren Court would remain to this view. 
Courts wrestled with this tension in the aftermath of Baker. Most 
challenged plans were measured against the population standard, and courts 
struck down a majority of them. But the one lesson of this period is that 
courts were all over the map. Some courts upheld plans that deviated from 
strict population equality while other courts struck down plans with smaller 
population variances. Of the first fifteen cases decided in the wake of 
Baker, eleven struck down the existing redistricting plans while four upheld 
them.150 And yet, “[t]he tremendous variance in statistics and legal 
reasoning running through these fifteen cases, however, makes 
identification of a coherent doctrine or numerical standard next to 
impossible.”151 This meant, according to Alexander Bickel, that “[t]he 
 
146.  Lewis, supra note 35, at 1086. 
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148.  See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237–41 (1962) (appendix to opinion of the Court). 
149.  Id. at 244–45 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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rationality test led nowhere; and within the year the Supreme Court had 
abandoned it.”152 
This was a crucial moment in the reapportionment revolution. The 
rationality test had been trumpeted by the reformers, from Anthony Lewis 
and Charles Rhyne to Solicitor General Cox, as the obvious solution to the 
question of standards. During the oral arguments, in fact, they had assured 
the Justices time and again that mathematical equality was not required. 
But as he looked to the future, Justice Brennan well understood that 
rationality was not the answer. 
Proceeding incrementally would result in a painful and confused 
process, and one that might ultimately fail. Addressing the 
apportionment problem required a single absolute standard. The 
Court’s standard had to ensure equality and had to be easily and 
unambiguously applied. Equally important, it must be rooted in 
constitutional principles and fundamental rights.153 
Once the courts abandoned the rationality test, there was one obvious 
replacement. “There was, Brennan understood even in the spring of 1962, 
just one such standard: equality.”154 
The Justices were soon flooded with cases and they needed to settle on 
how to approach them. They could not decide them piecemeal, because 
how they decided some questions might foreclose others. So the Justices, 
and particularly Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, decided to wait 
until they could settle on a constitutional test. The Court had two cases on 
its docket at the time it decided Baker—a challenge to Michigan’s 
redistricting plan155 and a challenge to New York’s apportionment of its 
state senate156—and it vacated the judgments for consideration in light of 
Baker. The courts had dismissed both claims for lack of jurisdiction, which 
meant that this remand was simply an order to hold hearings on the merits. 
The cases would come back to the Court the following year. This 
disposition would buy the Justices much needed time. 
There was one exception to this strategy: Georgia’s primary election 
law and the county-unit rule. The law, known as the Neill Primary Act, 
dated back to 1917 and governed state-wide primary races, such as 
governor, lieutenant governor, and U.S. Senator. Under the law, unit votes 
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were assigned to the various counties according to population.157 The eight 
most populous counties received six unit votes each; the next thirty 
counties received four unit votes; and the rest of the counties received two 
units a piece. In turn, the candidate who won the county’s popular vote 
received all the unit votes from that county, and the candidate who received 
the most unit votes won the nomination. What follows is quite familiar. 
When the law was first enacted, the state of Georgia had 159 counties, of 
which 121 were rural counties with less than 30% of the population. These 
rural counties controlled 242 unit votes, or around 60% of the total unit 
votes. In contrast, by 1960 the eight most populous counties had 40% of the 
state’s population yet less than 12% of the unit votes. The disparities 
between counties made little sense. Fulton County, with 556,326 residents, 
received six unit votes, or 1.46% of the total of 410 unit votes; whereas the 
smallest county in Georgia, Echols County, with 1,876 residents, received 
two unit votes, or 0.48% of the total.158 This was a classic “crazy quilt.” 
Even after the state amended the law on the same day that the District 
Court heard the case, the resulting disparities were irrational as measured 
by population totals. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that “[o]nce the geographical 
unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who 
participate in the election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race, 
whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and 
wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.”159 Most 
importantly, the Court offered for the first time its definition of political 
equality as required by the Constitution: “The conception of political 
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can 
mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”160 This was significant. To be 
sure, and as Justice Stewart underscored in his concurring opinion, this case 
involved the selection of a representative for a statewide constituency.161 
This was not Baker v. Carr, which involved the drawing of district lines—
and thus the forming of geographic constituencies—from which 
representatives would be chosen. But as Robert Dixon told Archibald Cox 
years later, the case “nevertheless coined the easily transferable ‘one man–
 
157.  Neill Primary Act §§ 34-3212–34-3218, GA. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1917), repealed by 34 GA. 
CODE ANN. § 2001 (1970). 
158.  See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 371–73 (1963). 
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one vote’ phrase, and conditioned all that followed.”162 Once the Court took 
this step, the road to mathematical equality became much easier. 
The Court decided Gray v. Sanders on March 18, 1963.163 This was a 
significant time in the South, and the state of Alabama in particular, as the 
setting for Reynolds v. Sims. The Birmingham campaign was just 
beginning, a nonviolent movement designed to bring attention to the city of 
Birmingham by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. This was a 
crucial moment in civil rights history. On April 12, Dr. King was arrested 
by Birmingham police for demonstrating without a permit, and four days 
letter he penned his canonical “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” On 
September 15, white supremacists set off a bomb at the Sixteenth Street 
Baptist Church. Four young girls were killed. The summer of ’63 was 
significant in other ways. President Kennedy delivered a speech on civil 
rights as he defended his decision to send the National Guard to the 
University of Alabama; James Meredith graduated from Ole Miss; and in 
August, Dr. King delivered his transcendental “I Have a Dream” speech in 
Washington, D.C. 
The civil rights movement was pressing the country to finally confront 
and remedy the effects of its racial past. Not coincidentally, the mantra of 
the movement, as coined by Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
President John Lewis, was “one man, one vote.” As he told the crowd 
during his speech at the March on Washington in August 1963, “‘One Man, 
One Vote’ is the African cry. It is ours, too. It must be ours.”164 At the same 
time, lawyers in Birmingham and across the country were asking the 
Supreme Court to force rural elites, under the guise of equal protection, to 
give up power to urbanites and, ultimately, suburbanites. Both avenues of 
reform complemented each other, and either one alone would not be 
enough. The movement sought to register eligible citizens, but their 
subsequent votes would prove meaningless if legislatures were not forced 
to reconfigure the severely malapportioned district lines. The Court and the 
movement would have to work together. 
By the summer of ’63, the Court had five cases on its docket: the 
Georgia congressional representation case and four redistricting cases from 
Alabama, Maryland, New York, and Virginia. The Court was ready to 
tackle the issue head-on. It had to answer three questions. First, what 
standard would guide courts and legislatures into the future? Would the 
Justices impose a rigid mathematical requirement, or would they follow a 
more flexible approach, as Baker promised and the Solicitor General 
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exhorted? Second, what role would the federal analogy play in the future? 
Would the Justices allow one house in a bicameral legislature to deviate 
from the metric of population? And third, would it make any constitutional 
difference whether the resulting malapportionment was a result of 
legislative inaction? 
The Court noted probable jurisdiction in Reynolds v. Sims and its 
companion cases on June 10, 1963.165 The following day, as George 
Wallace made his notorious stand at the schoolhouse door, the Court 
scheduled oral arguments for the week of November 12. With the 1964 
election looming, the Court stood ready to answer these questions. 
III. REYNOLDS 
Through the summer and fall of ’63, the Court noted probable 
jurisdiction on two more cases—one from Delaware, the other from 
Colorado. The Delaware case, Roman v. Sinnock, asked whether 
malapportionment could be justified by the state’s original compact, dating 
back to the time when the three counties in the state had created the state.166 
This was an easy case, and many observers wondered why the Court had 
accepted this case at all. The Court ultimately voted 8–1 to strike down 
Delaware’s plan.167 Only Justice Harlan dissented. 
The Colorado case would prove conceptually difficult. One of the 
leading reasons that led some of the Justices to vote with the majority in 
Baker was the lack of available avenues of reform. This was a classic 
legislative straight-jacket. The Colorado case would force the Court to test 
that position. The redistricting plan at issue in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth 
General Assembly of Colorado had been passed by a state-wide initiative, 
and it had only resulted in small population inequalities.168 The case would 
ask the Justices to consider whether majorities within a state could choose 
for themselves whether to redistrict under terms other than population. 
As the Justices looked to the future and the resolution of these various 
cases, a Brennan clerk, Stephen Barnett, wrote a 350-page brief that 
ultimately became the Justices’ guide.169 After parsing through every 
judicial standard proposed by judges, scholars, and commentators, Barnett 
settled on Solicitor General Cox’s standard as the only acceptable standard. 
This was the “arbitrary and capricious” standard that Cox had advocated in 
the Baker litigation and which he continued to advocate moving forward, 
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whether in briefs, internal memoranda, or future oral arguments. Cox did 
not wish for the Court to adopt a strict population standard, and thus 
invalidate a majority of state legislatures then in existence. Instead, 
population would provide an initial benchmark through which to evaluate 
redistricting plans. States may deviate from population equality, but they 
must have a legitimate and rational reason for doing so. 
The virtues of this standard were obvious. Chief among them was its 
flexibility. This was also its main drawback, because it would lead to 
inconsistent results. It would permit some grossly malapportioned plans, as 
in the New York litigation, while striking down fairer plans, as in the 
Virginia case. The standard lacked consistency, which depending on how 
one viewed the Court’s intervention, could be a virtue, but could also be a 
negative. This was precisely the virtue offered by strict population equality, 
a standard preferred by some Justices and many of the reformers. The 
standard would certainly be consistent, and it would also be easy to 
implement. 
This was the choice facing the Court on November 12, 1963, when it 
heard oral arguments over the course of four days on five cases: Reynolds 
v. Sims,170 which challenged the apportionment of the Alabama state 
legislature; WMCA v. Lomenzo,171 a case challenging New York’s 
apportionment formula; Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. 
Tawes,172 challenging Maryland’s malapportionment; Davis v. Mann,173 
which challenged Virginia’s apportionment statute; and Wesberry v. 
Sanders,174 the Georgia congressional case. The Court devoted nearly 
sixteen hours, over the course of five days, to the question of legislative 
apportionment. This was unprecedented for a single issue in the Court’s 
history. 
The argument split along familiar issues. The reformers pointed to 
population as the starting point. According to Chuck Morgan, the lead 
attorney in Reynolds, 
the one standard that is measurable in each instance leaving the less 
room for doubt and the less room for question insofar as each of 
the state legislatures of this nation are concerned, is the 
ascertainable standard of how many people are there in a 
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legislative district or how many people are there in a representative 
seat.175 
The Court might allow “administrative deviation,” but the leeway must not 
be “gross.”176 In addition, the reformers were largely willing to follow the 
federal analogy, and thus allow more flexibility in one of the two state 
houses. Not so for John McConnell or Chuck Morgan, who told the 
Justices that population must be the basis for both houses of a state 
legislature. But they were clearly in the minority. 
Expectedly, Solicitor General Cox offered the Justices a flexible 
standard. He also began with population as the baseline and the “crazy 
quilt” test. He argued further that equal protection is violated when the state 
incorporates a rule that expressly violates constitutional limits, or is 
invidious or else “irrelevant to any permissible purpose of legislative 
apportionment.”177 Finally, a reapportionment plan may not subordinate 
representation to a degree that results in minority rule. Cox wanted the 
Justices to decide no more than necessary. As for the future, he counseled 
“that what guidelines there are should emerge from deciding the minimum 
required in each of these cases and that the invitation to set forth general 
abstract rule is not one that I’m pressing in front of the Court.”178 
Predictably, attorneys for the state defended their plans. Some of the 
attorneys argued that their states’ plans were in fact rational. This was a 
difficult argument. In the Alabama case, the state Attorney General, 
Richmond Flowers, conceded as much: 
I do not believe that there is a citizen or an official of Alabama that 
could argue under any shadow of fairness or justice that 
apportionment of the legislature of Alabama under the 1901 
Constitution as it is here today or as when this suit started is 
anything but unfair, unjust and even approaches the ridiculous.179 
The attorneys also asked the Court to reconsider Baker v. Carr. And 
they pointed out that no objective criteria existed; to decide these cases was 
to take sides in political disputes. That is, “[i]f you go strictly to a 
population basis, then the larger, or densely populated counties, would have 
a stranglehold on the Alabama Legislature on a one man, one vote basis 
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and the people in the rural areas would not have any say so in their own 
government.”180 There would be no escaping this apparent dilemma. 
By the close of the arguments on Tuesday, the choices for the Justices 
were thus clear: a Frankfurterian retreat in the face of political risk; a 
population rule with varying degrees of rigidity; or a more cautious 
approach that allowed for state experimentation. The replacement of Justice 
Frankfurter with Justice Goldberg seemed to ensure that the Court would 
extend Baker to its logical conclusion. It was not clear quite yet, however, 
what that conclusion might be. 
In the last conference of the Thanksgiving break, the Justices agreed to 
strike down all redistricting plans in their docket. But the Justices had yet 
to settle on a standard. Rather than wait for a consensus to emerge, and at 
Justice Black’s insistence, the Court decided the Georgia congressional 
redistricting case, Wesberry v. Sanders,181 on February 17, 1964. 
Georgia congressional districts suffered from the same 
malapportionment as most other plans across the country, state and federal, 
and for similar reasons. For a way to handle the problem, Justice Black 
explicitly turned away from the Fourteenth Amendment and to Article I, 
Section Two of the Constitution, which states that House members must be 
selected “by the People of the several States.”182 From this language, a six-
member majority concluded that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote 
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”183 To hold 
otherwise, and allow vote dilution at the district level, would be in clear 
tension with “fundamental ideas of democratic government.”184 It would 
also mean that the House was not “elected ‘by the People.’”185 
This was a remarkable decision. For one, the Court had explicitly 
overruled Colegrove v. Green. Most brazenly, and as Justice Harlan 
pointed out in dissent, Wesberry placed into question the constitutionality 
of the membership of the House. “I had not expected to witness the day,” 
he began his dissent, “when the Supreme Court of the United States would 
render a decision which casts grave doubt on the constitutionality of the 
composition of the House of Representatives.”186 By his count, the decision 
called into question the validity of 398 representatives from 37 states. The 
decision, in other words, left “a ‘constitutional’ House of 37 members now 
sitting.”187 The Justices were no longer afraid to take on powerful political 
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institutions, even a coordinate branch of the national government. They had 
come a long way since 1946. 
More importantly, the Justices had inched a step closer towards 
demanding population equality across the country. It was only a matter of 
time, even if both Georgia cases could be easily distinguished. Population 
would be the starting point. But questions still remained. For example, how 
much flexibility would the Justices allow local jurisdictions, if any 
flexibility at all? Would the Justices authorize states to follow the federal 
analogy? And what role would the “straightjacket” argument play into the 
future? That is, might the Justices allow state majorities to allocate seats 
across the state away from population? 
There was no doubt that after Wesberry, “[t]he reapportionment 
revolution was now in full swing.”188 Where the revolution would 
ultimately go, and how extensive its demands would be, was left to the pen 
and constitutional imagination of the Chief Justice. 
The story of Reynolds v. Sims is really the story of Chief Justice 
Warren’s odyssey. This is a great yet misunderstood story. In 1948, as 
Governor of California and Republican nominee for the vice presidency, 
Warren gave a speech that essentially killed efforts to redistrict in the state. 
He argued against a strict population basis for representation and for the 
value of counties. This was in line with the old debate. “Many California 
counties are far more important in the life of the State than their population 
bears to the entire population of the State. It is for this reason that I have 
never been in favor of restricting the representation in the senate to a 
strictly population basis.”189 Instead, he continued, and for “the same 
reason that the Founding Fathers of our country gave balanced 
representation to the States of the Union—equal representation in one 
house and proportionate representation based on population in the other.”190 
This was an argument for the federal compromise. 
By 1963–1964, however, he appears to have had a change of heart. But 
to so argue, or to brand him a hypocrite, as many did at the time, would be 
to misunderstand the questions as Earl Warren understood them. He did not 
change his mind, nor was he wrong for accepting the federal compromise 
during his term as governor. They were not the same questions. In other 
words, it is best to understand Warren, and the questions he faced, as 
matters of institutional competence and epistemic authority. 
As a governor, Warren had to consider the needs of his state as a 
whole. He had to balance constituencies, whether urban or rural, north or 
south, parties and ideologies. He had to govern a large and complex state. 
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Warren himself wrote in his autobiography that the issue as governor “was 
frankly a matter of political expediency.”191 
In contrast, Chief Justice Warren had to contend with very different 
complexities. Once the Court came into the thicket in Baker, it had to find a 
line between malapportionments that amount to crazy quilts and those that 
remain within rational (i.e., constitutional) limits. In other words, Chief 
Justice Warren had to delineate the demands of constitutional equality. This 
is how Warren put the distinction to Francis Beytagh, his law clerk at the 
time: “I never really thought very much about it then. As a political matter 
it seemed to me to be a sensible arrangement. But now, as a constitutional 
matter, with the point of view of the responsibilities of a Justice, I kind of 
got to look at it differently.”192 
A few years ago, while doing research in the Library of Congress, we 
made a very interesting find among the papers of Chief Justice Warren: a 
handwritten memo delineating his thought process as he arrived at 
equipopulation as the proper standard for redistricting units. Warren told 
his former law clerk, Jesse Choper, that he had not started with equal 
population in mind but “[a]fter a while I just couldn’t see any other way, 
any other principle that would handle the situation.”193 The memo offers a 
window into how Warren arrived at this decision. Remember the two big 
questions he faced: how flexible must the population standard be; and what 
to do about the federal analogy, and whether one of the two houses of a 
state legislature may deviate from strict population equality? Here was his 
answer, in full: 
1. There can be no formula for determining whether equal 
protection has been afforded. 
2. Many laws result in harshness as to some people yet must meet 
the test of the Constitution 
3. However, we have held in Baker v. Carr that it is our province to 
ensure equal protection in this area. 
4. We must have some starting point. 
5. That starting point is whether it meets our conception of a 
Republican form of government 
6. The basic factor of a representative form of government is that it 
is representative 
7. To me that means fair representation of all who are governed 
8. We have held in Saunders that as to individuals it means 
absolute equality 
 
191.  WARREN, supra note 2, at 310. 
192.  BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A 
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 504 (1983). 
193.  ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 436 (1997). 
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9. Now we are forced with constitutes fair representation of units 
of government 
10. That takes us into the complexities of government which 
precludes a rigid rule 
11. There must be some room for play in the joints 
12. But it should not lead us away from the principle of equality 
13. So I start with the premise of equal representation 
14. The Constitution recognizes it in Article I and 14th 
Amendment 
15. Therefore in determining constitutionality of any system of 
apportionment we must take it by the four corners and determine 
whether there has been an effort to achieve equality of 
representation 
16. If so – ok. If not – unconstitutional 
17. This does not tie the states to any form of representation – 
bicameral – unicameral 
18. It merely means that under whatever the form of representative 
government it must be equally rep. 
19. To what extent can there be room for play in the joints. 
20. Cannot set out all 
21. We must relate the question to the political structure of that 
state 
22. If that structure does not violate constitutional principles, the 
method of apportionment can be justified if it does not achieve 
invidious discrimination 
23. If its basic principle is to accord a maximum amount of home 
rule through cities or counties or districts it may do so if it is 
approximate equality 
24. But it cannot so apportion as to give more power to one than 
another on the basis that it is entitled to wield more power than 
others. 
25. This cannot be done because of 
 1: the class of citizenship 
 2: the area involved 
 3: economic interests 
 4: rural, urban, etc. 
26. All of these considerations are involved in at least one of these 
cases 
27. The state can provide for representation of every unit but it 
cannot limit the size of the representative body so as to 
discriminate 
28. In the NY case it does exactly that thing 
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29. The formula was fixed as of 1894 and so fixed that the more 
populous the cities became, the greater the disparity in their 
proportionate representation. This is invidious. 
30. This is not the so-called federal plan because neither house is 
apportioned according to population 
31. The NY system is not a crazy quilt system. it is deliberate 
discrimination 
32. Also there is no adequate political remedy. the constitutional 
convention cannot be voted on but once every 20 years and that is 
not an adequate remedy. 
33. The discrimination is therefore built in. 
34. it is now 38% Senate 37% House194 
This memo is important for a number of reasons. First is the fact that 
well into the spring of 1964, Chief Justice Warren was still trying to figure 
out where he stood on these questions. The issue was hardly settled. 
Second is his concession that the population standard must be flexible; 
“there must be some room for play in the joints.” This is another way of 
saying, like Justice Douglas and others before him, that population was 
only the starting point. Many Justices, and the Chief Justice must be 
included among them, would point to invidious discrimination as the 
moment when the state had gone too far. But that was a conclusion, not a 
useful standard. Standing alone, the term “invidious discrimination” meant 
nothing. 
Finally, Warren appears to implicitly accept the federal analogy when 
he writes that the New York plan “is not the so-called federal plan because 
neither house is apportioned according to population.” Were one of the 
houses apportioned on a population basis, it might meet with his approval. 
On June 15, 1964, the Justices announced the decision in Reynolds v. 
Sims and its companion cases.195 The Chief Justice worried that the leading 
case was from the state of Alabama. He did not want the public to think 
that he had a vendetta against the South. Perceptions were important. 1964 
was the year of Freedom Summer, a voter registration project in 
Mississippi, and June 15 in particular was the day that the first three 
hundred volunteers arrived. More tragically, Michael Schwerner, Andrew 
Goodman, and James Chaney disappeared the next day. Warren had reason 
to worry. 
But Reynolds offered the Court the cleanest set of facts possible, 
unencumbered by side issues. The facts were also familiar ones. The state 
 
194.  Notes Made by Chief Justice Warren, Reynolds v. Sims, Earl Warren Papers, Library of 
Congress, box 608, file 508. 
195.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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had apportioned back in 1901, in line with the state Constitution, and then 
refused to reapportion since.196 The resulting plan was a crazy quilt. Some 
counties with populations as large as 109,047 had two representatives in 
the state house, as did counties with as few as 13,462. Lowndes County, 
with a population of 15,417, had two representatives and one senator. In 
contrast, Jefferson County, with a population of 634,864, had seven 
representatives and also one senator. The disparities across the state plan 
were manifold. The plaintiffs alleged that the disparities amounted to 
unconstitutional discrimination under the 14th Amendment and the state 
constitution.197 
With the benefit of hindsight, Reynolds was almost preordained. But 
writing at the time, Anthony Lewis expressed the view that “[f]ew Supreme 
Court decisions have stunned this hardened capital city as has yesterday’s 
ruling that state legislative districts must be substantially equal in 
population.”198 The Supreme Court concluded, in an 8–1 decision, that 
population was the constitutional starting point and the controlling criterion 
for assessing the constitutionality of state apportionment plans.199 Both 
Gray and Wesberry featured prominently in the Court’s decision. In fact, 
the Court treated both cases as establishing a constitutional baseline of 
equality. Reynolds was only recognizing what prior cases, and our 
constitutional history, established as a “fundamental principle of 
representative government.”200 This was a baseline of substantial equality, 
however. For the future, the question was whether states may move away 
from this baseline. This was the question that Reynolds and its companion 
cases set out to answer. 
This is where the Court’s oft-cited passage makes sense: “Legislators 
represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not 
farms or cities or economic interests.”201 As easily as that, the Court 
essentially removed all existing considerations outside of population for 
creating legislative districts. To be sure, the Court agreed that a state may 
create district lines along existing political subdivision lines. This would 
help guard against the creation of gerrymandered districts. But the Court 
immediately cautioned that states may not submerge population in the 
pursuit of this objective. Justice Harlan dissented precisely on this point. 
 
196.  See id. at 540. 
197.  See id. at 541. 
198.  Anthony Lewis, Districts Ruling Shocks Capital, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1964, at 29. 
199.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567. 
200.  Id. at 560. 
201.  Id. at 562. 
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In one or another of today’s opinions, the Court declares it 
unconstitutional for a State to give effective consideration to any of 
the following in establishing legislative districts: 
(1) history; 
(2) “economic or other sorts of group interests”; 
(3) area; 
(4) geographical considerations; 
(5) a desire “to insure effective representation for sparsely settled 
areas”; 
(6) “availability of access of citizens to their representatives”; 
(7) theories of bicameralism (except those approved by the Court); 
(8) occupation; 
(9) “an attempt to balance urban and rural power.” 
(10) the preference of a majority of voters in the State. 
. . . . 
 I know of no principle of logic or practical or theoretical 
politics, still less any constitutional principle, which establishes all 
or any of these exclusions. Certain it is that the Court’s opinion 
does not establish them.202 
The last consideration—“the preference of a majority of voters in the 
State”—is particularly troubling.203 This was the principle established by 
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado.204 Lucas asked the 
Court to consider whether modern-day majorities may relax the equal 
population rule as applied to their particular states. This was not Tennessee, 
nor was it Alabama or many of the states involved in the reapportionment 
cases. But that fact did not make any difference to the Justices, who 
responded glibly that “[a] citizen’s constitutional rights can hardly be 
infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it be.”205 
 
202.  Id. at 622–23 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
203.  Id. at 623. 
204.  Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 713 (1964). 
205.  Id. at 736–37. 
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Population had thus become the sine qua non of legislative districting. Both 
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population 
basis. As a result, Reynolds and its companion cases declared 
“unconstitutional the legislatures of most of the 50 States.”206 
At root, Reynolds is a deeply ironic case. The Court paid lip service to 
the notion that the case sought to protect the right of qualified citizens to 
vote, and “to have their votes counted.”207 But Reynolds is best understood 
as a governance case. The Court ensured that white suburban majorities 
enjoyed the right to govern that was their due. But the irony sets in once we 
see how the Court got there. Early in the opinion, Warren essentially turned 
to the Fifteenth Amendment, and cases such as Gomillion, the White 
Primary Cases,208 U.S. v. Classic,209 and Guinn v. United States,210 in order 
to recognize a Fourteenth Amendment governance right.211 Majorities have 
a right to govern, and minorities are amply protected by our constitutional 
system. Representative government demands no less. 
Looking ahead, vital questions remained.212 How strictly would the 
Court apply the equality principle? Would the case extend to other 
institutions, such as city councils, county commissions, or school boards? 
And finally, would the Court continue on the road to political equality and 
“seek to apply constitutional controls to gerrymandering”?213 This was a 
much harder question, and seemed “far less amenable to constitutional 
adjudication than apportioning numbers of representatives to geographical 
districts.”214 This was the next logical step in the reapportionment 
revolution. And after Wesberry and Reynolds, was there anything the Court 
could not do? 
In an internal memorandum to Attorney General Kennedy in August 
1963, Solicitor General Cox offered his prediction about the 
reapportionment revolution. He stated: “[M]y appraisal of sentiment within 
the legal profession – and probably outside – is that while the invalidation 
of the egregiously malapportioned legislatures would command a 
consensus of opinion, a ‘one man—one vote’ decision would precipitate a 
major constitutional crisis causing an enormous drop in public support for 
 
206.  Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
207.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554. 
208.  Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. 
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
209.  313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
210.  238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
211.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554–555. 
212.  See ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN 
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 120–23 (1968). 
213.  Id. at 123. 
214.  Id. 
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the Court.”215 This is a prediction in line with earlier concerns expressed by 
Justices Homes and Frankfurter, and even Alexander Hamilton in his well-
known Federalist 78216: the Court must be cautious in its approach to 
questions of politics. The Justices have neither the sword nor the purse, but 
only judgment and the belief that their decisions are demanded by higher 
law. They must never compromise this belief. 
Solicitor General Cox’s concerns were ultimately misplaced. 
Compliance was almost immediate, almost unparalleled in the history of 
the Court. According to Herbert Wechsler, in fact, “no decision in the 
history of the judicial process ever has achieved so much so soon.”217 
Crucially, the equipopulation revolution was positively received by the 
public at large. The public supported the Court in great numbers.218 In fact, 
as far as public opinion was concerned, Reynolds was an unqualified 
success. 
As expected, elite opinion responded very differently. Writing in the 
summer of 1964, Anthony Lewis explained that “[t]he curious thing about 
the current furor . . . is that [Reynolds] cannot really be shown to have 
aroused large-scale opposition among the public . . . . This would seem to 
be strictly a politicians’ rebellion.”219 The reaction began soon after the 
Court decided Baker v. Carr, when the Council of State Governments 
proposed three constitutional amendments. The Council came two states 
short of the thirty-four states needed to call a constitutional convention.220 
In specific response to Reynolds, the 1964 Republican platform called for 
“a Constitutional amendment, as well as legislation, enabling states having 
bicameral legislatures to apportion one House on bases of their choosing, 
including factors other than population.”221 
During the presidential campaign that year, Barry Goldwater similarly 
criticized the Court as part of his larger critique about the Warren Court 
and its judicial overreaching. He complained that the reapportionment 
cases would “have a more dangerous effect than anything that’s happened 
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throughout the course of our Republic.”222 More specifically, he argued that 
Reynolds would “destroy the representative vote of the small States, 
populationwise. It’s going to destroy the suburban vote . . . the farmer, the 
miner, the forester’s vote, and place it all in the concentration of boss-
controlled cities, mostly in the East . . . where we find crime on the 
streets.”223 
Congressional leaders responded similarly.224 Multiple bills were 
introduced in Congress limiting the jurisdiction of the Court or delaying 
implementation of court orders. The Senate even took the unusual step of 
reducing a pay increase for the Justices by $5,000. Senator Dirksen led the 
opposition in the Senate, introducing a constitutional amendment that 
mirrored the 1964 Republican platform. But Dirksen could not secure the 
requisite two-thirds majority. Dirksen re-introduced an amendment the 
following year, which fell nine votes short. Dirksen tried a third time. By 
the summer of 1966, however, forty-six states had complied with the 
Court’s ruling and the four remaining states were expected to comply in the 
near future. The fight appeared over. Senator Dirksen then attempted to call 
a constitutional convention but could not reach the requisite number of 
states by the time of his death in 1969. The reapportionment revolution was 
not only underway but almost over even as it began. Few were left to put 
up a fight. 
IV. REYNOLDS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
An important question about Reynolds and the reapportionment 
revolution is whether the Court’s intervention made much of a difference in 
terms of changing policy and the distribution of resources. The political 
science literature on the policy and electoral consequences of the 
reapportionment revolution has been all over the map. Moreover, the 
results may differ depending upon whether one is looking at the effects of 
malapportionment of the state legislatures or the effect of 
malapportionment of the United States House of Representatives. Scholars 
critical of malapportionment generally argued that “legislative 
malapportionment is largely responsible for or connected with lack of party 
competition, divided government, unfair distribution of funds, and 
 
222.  Id. at 429 (quoting Barry M. Goldwater, Speech Before the Committee on Commerce, 
United States Senate, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., in 3 CAMPAIGN ’64. THE SPEECHES, REMARKS, PRESS 
CONFERENCES, AND RELATED PAPERS OF SENATOR BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JULY 16 THROUGH 
NOVEMBER 4, 1964, at 170 (1965)). 
223.  Id. 
224.  For a terrific account of this reaction, see RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT 
CASES (1970), chapter 9. 
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unprogressive legislation.”225 As Ward Elliott wrote in an early assessment 
of the reapportionment revolution: 
In 1962 it was conventional wisdom among the cognoscenti . . . 
that Malapportionment was to blame for the worst problems of 
government at every level. It was supposed to have reduced city 
dwellers to second-class citizens, and to have stifled urgently 
needed reforms like home rule, slum clearance, metropolitan 
transit, annexation, labor and welfare legislation, civil rights laws, 
equal tax laws, and equal expenditures on schools and roads.226 
One political scientist, writing after Baker but before the bulk of the 
Court’s reapportionment decisions, expected the reapportionment 
revolution to have at least three effects.227 First, at the very least, 
reapportionment at the state level was expected to increase the 
representation of urban and suburban areas over that of rural areas.228 
Second, reapportionment was expected to impact the political structure of 
the state and affect the competition between the two dominant parties.229 
Third, reapportionment was expected to have distributional effects on state 
public policy.230 In particular, observers expected reapportionment to 
produce public policy benefits that reflected the preferences of urban and 
suburban voters. It is the third expectation of reapportionment that captured 
the attention of most researchers. 
Early work by numerous political scientists concluded that 
reapportionment did not or was not likely to have any distributional effects, 
especially at the state level.231 For example, Thomas Dye’s study, which 
sought to determine the effects of malapportionment on both the public 
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policy in all fifty states and on party competition, concluded that “the 
policy choices of malapportioned legislatures are not noticeably different 
from the policy choices of well-apportioned legislatures.”232 But the 
conclusions of the early studies were not uniform. Some scholars were able 
to find political and distributional effects. For example, Robert Erikson’s 
study of the impact of reapportionment on the party composition of state 
legislatures concluded that reapportionment helped the Democratic Party 
gain seats at the expense of the Republican Party.233 The partisan effect was 
particularly pronounced in the most malapportioned states. Similarly, 
Douglas Fieg concluded that reapportionment was responsible for 
increased state expenditures in local education and in public welfare.234 
Feig’s study was part of a growing list of early work that found at least 
some effects of reapportionment and also raised questions about the 
methodological limitations of some of the earlier studies.235 
As a general matter, later studies, many using more sophisticated 
methodological analysis, have been less equivocal about the effects of 
reapportionment. For example, Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz 
concluded that reapportionment impacted Congressional budget allocations 
in favor of metropolitan areas and against urban areas.236 The McCubbins 
and Schwartz study is one of several important recent studies reinforcing 
the conclusion that the design of electoral institutions matter.237 The 
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reapportionment revolution mattered for political representation,238 it 
mattered for politics,239 and it mattered for public policy.240 
Though it is true that Baker, Reynolds, and the reapportionment cases 
are important because of their impact on the political process, it is also true 
that the impact of the reapportionment revolution was not sufficiently 
systematic and was too contextual for the reapportionment cases to be 
notable on the basis of their political impact alone. Thus, in assessing the 
reapportionment cases, it is not sufficient to consider political impact alone. 
Baker, Reynolds, and the apportionment cases are consequential because 
they represent the promise that courts are a necessary and credible 
institution for addressing the inevitable pathologies of democratic politics. 
If the Court can compel the restructuring of the political institutions of the 
upper and lower houses in all of the states, the House of Representatives, 
and even local governmental units such as school districts, how can there 
be any limits to the questions that the Court can or should tackle?241 The 
reapportionment cases created an expectation of the Court as a deus ex 
machina, an exogenous force, the god that would deliver us all from the 
predicaments created by our political rulers. This is a legacy of the 
reapportionment cases, the Court is always part of the background 
discussion on questions of law in politics, no matter the question. 
Additionally, and relatedly, Baker, Reynolds, and the reapportionment 
cases reflect the lens through which the Court and students of law and 
politics understand the terms of judicial involvement in democratic politics. 
The foundational questions and tensions that attend the Court’s 
involvement in supervising democratic politics have their roots in the 
reapportionment cases. We describe these tensions as dualities and 
dichotomies. Each duality pulls the Court in two opposing directions. 
Moreover, the dualities are non-ideological. That is, sometimes the liberals 
or the conservatives on the Court will prefer one side of the duality and 
sometimes they’ll prefer the other. Outcomes do not invariably track one 
side of the duality. These dualities enable the pull-push dynamic that 
sometimes attends the Court’s law and politics jurisprudence. These 
dualities also provide some explanation for why there is often so little 
consistency in the Court’s law and politics jurisprudence and why it is 
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extremely difficult to articulate an overarching theory of the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area.242 
Take first the preliminary question of whether courts ought to have a 
role as supervisors of the ground rules of democratic politics. Until the 
reapportionment cases—that is, for the vast majority of the history of the 
United States—the Supreme Court refrained from refereeing disputes over 
the ground rules of the political process. This posture was understandable 
for many reasons. The Constitution has very little to say about the types of 
political disputes that have eventually found their way onto the Court’s 
docket. This includes disputes over political representation, the 
apportionment of political power, the cabining of political power, the 
criteria pursuant to which the state can determine who can participate in 
democratic politics, and the like. Moreover, when the Constitution speaks 
clearly about the ground rules of democratic politics, its prescriptions are 
often as much to state as to federal actors.243 And those directives are 
clearly to legislatures and not to courts. When the Constitution’s 
prescriptions are more ambiguous, it is unclear whether its directives are 
aimed in any way toward courts or whether they are exclusively concerned 
with guiding the behavior of other democratic actors.244 Further still, even 
where the Constitution seems to speak to courts, for example in the area of 
racial discrimination in voting per the Fifteenth Amendment, courts, in 
comparison to legislatures, have limited institutional ability to root out 
entrenched structural discrimination. It was not until the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 that the United States made significant progress 
on reducing racial discrimination in voting, notwithstanding the adoption of 
the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870.245 As compared to legislatures, courts 
may be at an institutional disadvantage in addressing the structural 
pathologies of the political process. 
Thus, for a very long time, the Court’s official position on the question 
of supervision of democratic politics was one of institutional abstention. 
Institutional abstention, as judicial posture, is animated by the general 
worry that the Court, because of a particularly unique institutional fragility, 
is a specifically vulnerable institution when it engages democratic politics. 
This posture of judicial restraint is justified by a number of rationalizations, 
 
242.  One explanation for why it is difficult to articulate the Court’s overarching theory of 
democratic politics and to ascertain its contours is because the Court does not have one. See, e.g., James 
A. Gardner, Partitioning and Rights: The Supreme Court’s Accidental Jurisprudence of Democratic 
Process, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 61 (2014). 
243.  See, e.g., id. at 73. 
244.  See, for example, the Guarantee Clause in Article IV, Section 4, which the Court has held 
nonjusticiable. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding that Guarantee Clause claims 
are nonjusticiable political questions). 
245.  See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: 
The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389 (2015). 
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reflecting an assumption about the nature of the Court’s institutional 
fragility, such as the Court’s sense of its own institutional impotence, or 
that the Court does not have a constitutional mandate to decide democratic 
disputes,246 or that the Court lacks the institutional competence to resolve 
fundamental democratic questions,247 or that it is politically prudent for the 
Court to absent itself from political disputes among the political branches248 
so as not to politicize the Court in a way that would undermine the Court’s 
core functions,249 or whatever justification that would rationalize 
institutional abstention. Whatever the justification, the pull of judicial 
abstention facilitated the Court’s hands-off approach to the problems of 
democratic politics.  
But the pull of judicial abstention was not and is not a unique force. 
The pressure that the Court as an institution has experienced and continues 
to experience with respect to its role in democratic politics is not 
unidirectional. The Court was and is also being pulled, in the opposite 
direction, by a similarly powerful force urging the Court to engage in the 
political process. Tugging the Court away from abstention is a force that 
we will call judicial democratic exceptionalism, which is the conception 
that the Court is the only institution capable of resolving the pathologies of 
the political process. At the heart of exceptionalism is the contention that 
the Court is uniquely situated as an institution to supervise the democratic 
process because the Court is inoculated from whatever the pathology du 
jour that is afflicting the democratic processes and leading to the current 
political problem.  
Sometimes the Court gives in to abstention, sometimes it gives in to 
exceptionalism. Like institutional abstention, the justifications for judicial 
exceptionalism are manifold. Justifications include the argument that the 
Constitution has assigned a particular role to the Court, or John Hart Ely’s 
process theory, or the Issacharoff-Pildes partisan lock-up theory, or some 
notion of constitutional pluralism,250 or political theory, or a 
straightforward articulation of the principal-agent problem,251 or, as in Bush 
v. Gore, the argument that Court is the only institution that can resolve a 
 
246.  See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY 
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 71–72, 139, 153–54 (2003). 
247.  Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, Déjà vu all over Again: Courts, Corporate Law, 
and Election Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 86 (2013); Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law: 
Partisan Gerrymandering and a Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 
1099–1100 (2007). 
248.  See generally Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, “Fair 
Representation” and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527 (2003). 
249.   See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: 
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002). 
250.  See, e.g., id. 
251.  D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013). 
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political impasse, or whatever justification that would rationalize the 
Court’s engagement with democratic politics. 
Judicial democratic exceptionalism is the product of the 
reapportionment cases, though some might argue that it has its roots earlier 
in the cases addressing racial discrimination in the political process, cases 
such as Gomillion v. Lightfoot and the White Primary Cases. A recurring 
question in the Court’s law and politics cases and in the field of law and 
politics is whether we learn anything about the Court’s ability to regulate 
democratic politics from the Court’s cases addressing racial discrimination 
in the political process.252 The Court itself has been split on that question. 
In Colegrove v. Green, the Frankfurter-led majority argued that the racial 
cases were inapposite.253 In Baker v. Carr, the Brennan-led majority relied 
heavily on Gomillion v. Lightfoot in support of its argument that political 
equality cases were justiciable.254 The racial cases are particularly relevant 
to the institutional exceptionalism argument because they arrived at a time 
when the political processes were completely unresponsive to the menace 
of racial discrimination in democratic politics, as well as in all areas of 
life.255 Thus, the contention that the Court was the only available option 
and that it had an obligation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition on race discrimination in voting was compelling. Nevertheless, 
even if one believed that Gomillion, the White Primary Cases, and other 
racial discrimination cases offered a glimpse of the possibilities for judicial 
intervention, the reapportionment cases were gamechangers.  
Reynolds was a moment of creation.256 In Gomillion and the White 
Primary Cases the Court selectively intervened in the political process to 
tackle particular instances of local discrimination and negative state laws or 
local ordinances. In Reynolds and the reapportionment cases, the Court 
sought to remake the electoral processes of the nation and imposed its will 
on the whole country—all of the states, including local electoral structures, 
and the United States House of Representatives. The Court acted boldly 
and muscularly in Reynolds in order to curb the worst political excesses. 
Reynolds is similar to the Warren-era case that preceded it, Brown v. 
Board of Education.257 Brown sought to restructure American society to 
make it consistent with the Court’s understanding of the Constitution’s 
conception of racial equality. Brown was obviously a critical intervention. 
 
252.  See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
253.  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946). 
254.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 229–31 (1962). 
255.  We will return shortly to the question of whether race is an appropriate guide for political 
participation cases that do not involve race. 
256.  See generally Roy A. Schotland, The Limits of Being “Present at the Creation”, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. 1505 (2002). 
257.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
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Likewise, Reynolds sought to restructure the political process to make it 
consistent with the Court’s understanding of the Constitution’s conception 
of political equality. It too was a critical intervention. Both cases hover like 
a brooding omnipresence over American society and American politics 
respectively. Their appearance promised much and they were full of 
possibilities. 
The Court’s aggressive posture in regulating the Law of Democracy 
remains with us to this day. Reynolds raised the expectation that there is no 
aspect of democratic politics that is off limits to judicial intervention. If the 
Court could intervene in the political process in this way, in such grand 
fashion, and arguably so successfully, the Court must be uniquely 
positioned to resolve any and all of the excesses of democratic politics. 
This is how the Court ended up resolving a presidential dispute in the 2000 
Presidential elections. Reynolds is the umbilical cord that nourished Bush v. 
Gore. “The Court’s initial incursion into the political thicket convinced it 
that the judiciary, and not the political process, even once it had been freed 
of the stranglehold of malapportionment, should continually regulate the 
fundamental rules of political engagement. In short, one person, one vote 
has encouraged the Court’s hubris.”258 This is the expectation that Reynolds 
and the reapportionment cases created.259 
Reynolds birthed institutional exceptionalism and by doing so, it 
created the tension with an equally strong expectation of judicial 
abstention, rooted in almost 150 years of judicial inaction in democratic 
politics. With each issue, the Court is now confronted with two opposing 
and arguably equal impulses, abstention and exception. This is the first 
duality. 
A second duality is one very familiar to law and it is the traditional 
debate between rules versus standards.260 When a Court or decisionmaker is 
applying a legal directive to resolve a problem, such as the regulation of 
democratic politics including democratic politics, it must decide what legal 
directive applies to the problem or it must prescribe some legal directive to 
guide judges, other political actors, and other interested observers.261 For 
 
258.  Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, Constitutional Farce, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 180 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford V. Levinson eds., 
1998). 
259.  To return to the Brown analogy, from our view, neither case lived up to the expectation that 
it engendered that it would fully remake American society in its respective domain. The Court has never 
tackled systematic racial discrimination in American life in the manner in promised by Brown. 
Similarly, the Court has never tackled political inequality in the deep transformative manner promised 
by Reynolds. 
260.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rule and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
261.  See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 260, at 57 (“Law translates background social policies or 
political principles such as truth, fairness, efficiency, autonomy, and democracy into a grid of legal 
directives that decisionmakers in turn apply to particular cases and facts.”). 
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example, in the reapportionment context, when the Court decided that the 
design of electoral institutions was subject to a constitutional command of 
political equality, it had to articulate the substantive content of that 
command. In formulating the substantive content of the command, the 
Court also had to decide the level of specificity at which it would articulate 
the directive, whether the directive would be articulated at a very high level 
of generality—a standard—or high degree of specificity—a rule.  
From the rules/standards literature we know that there are costs and 
benefits to both approaches. “Rules are more costly to promulgate than 
standards because rules involve advance determinations of the law’s 
content, whereas standards are more costly for legal advisors to predict or 
enforcement authorities to apply because they require later determinations 
of the law’s content.”262 If it is important to know the content of a legal 
directive ex ante for a problem that recurs frequently, then a rule is 
generally better than a standard. If a legal directive is being applied to a 
problem that is varied and complex with multiple permutations and 
knowledge about the content of the legal directive is easily learned ex post, 
a standard is generally better than a rule. Rules are thought to limit 
discretion, whereas standards facilitate discretion and allow decisionmakers 
to take into account a range of factors, especially when the decisionmaker 
is trustworthy.263 
When the Court decided to intervene in democratic politics in 1964, the 
Supreme Court faced a challenging and classic choice between standards 
and rules.264 One option was to follow the path left open in Baker v. Carr. 
This path would posit the Court as deferential to political decisions made 
elsewhere and would warrant intervention only when the resulting 
discrimination “reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious 
action.”265 This was a “well developed and familiar”266 judicial standard. A 
second option was for the Court to impose a more aggressive and assertive 
set of principles on state legislatures. The obvious candidate for adoption 
was the “one person, one vote” rule. The Court chose a rule in Reynolds, 
though it could have easily chosen a standard. 
 
262.  Kaplow, supra note 260, at 562–63. 
263.  Sullivan, supra note 260, at 57. 
264.  See Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of 
Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 78–79 (2002); Sullivan, supra note 260. 
265.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962). 
266.  Id.; see also Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673 (1966) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“The equal protection cases carefully analyzed boil down to the principle that distinctions 
drawn and even discriminations imposed by state laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause so 
long as these distinctions and discriminations are not ‘irrational,’ ‘irrelevant,’ ‘unreasonable,’ 
‘arbitrary,’ or ‘invidious.’”); ELY, supra note 8, at 121 (stating that “the usual demand of the Equal 
Protection Clause is simply that the discrimination in question be rationally explainable”). 
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“One person, one vote” was an attractive option, not least because it 
was a terrific slogan to rally the nation behind the Court and the Court’s 
latest incursion into a new and quite difficult political terrain. One person, 
one vote seemed like a universal constitutional principle of equality. As a 
constitutional principle, it had intuitive appeal. Moreover, and as 
importantly, it was administrable; lower courts could easily apply it.267 
“One person, one vote” became the law of the land. 
The Warren Court took what appeared to be the path of least resistance. 
We sympathize with the Court’s initial impulse. Were the Court to 
implement a rationality standard, its role in political questions of this sort 
would seem interminable, messy, even unbounded. Every redistricting plan 
would be the subject of litigation and outcomes might be difficult to 
decipher a priori. In contrast, “one person, one vote” offered the promise of 
surgical intervention,268 a rule that even a sixth grader might apply.269 It is 
rigid, to be sure, but simple to apply and predictable in its results. 
Consequently, and most importantly, the rule would allow courts to play a 
lessened role into the future. This is an area where the Justices inevitably 
face criticisms that political considerations and ideology influence their 
decisions. Rules shield the Justices from these criticisms.  
But in choosing rules over standards in Reynolds and in the 
reapportionment cases, the Court may have either intuited that law and 
politics disputes are best addressed via rules or the Court may have created 
a preference for using rules to decide law and politics disputes. Whether the 
Court’s reach for the one person, one vote principle reflects its intuition 
that law and politics disputes are best resolved by the articulation of a rule 
as opposed to a standard, or whether the Court created an expectation in 
Reynolds that law and politics disputes will be resolved via rules over 
standards, a preference for rules over standards seems to exist in election 
law. Consider some examples.  
The Court has declined to impose limits on the problem of political 
gerrymandering in large part because it has not been able to settle on the 
 
267.  But “the more troublesome question,” as John Hart Ely famously quipped, “is what else it 
has to recommend it.” See ELY, supra note 8, at 121; see also Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: 
A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (2002) (“My goal in this Essay is to express 
some of my own uncertainties about what the term one person, one vote actually does, or, just as much 
to the point, should, mean.”). 
268.  But maybe not. See Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting 
Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1441 (2002) (“[B]right-line rules may [] 
result in more widespread judicial interference in the political process than broad theories because only 
the latter offer grounds for discerning sensible limiting principles and making contextual judgments 
regarding application of the equality norm.”). 
269.  Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
joined by Clark, J., dissenting) (complaining that “the Court says that the requirements of the Equal 
Protection Clause can be met in any State only by the uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed 
application of sixth-grade arithmetic”). 
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political gerrymandering analog to reapportionment’s one person, one vote 
principle.270 In Vieth v. Jubilerer,271 four Justices concluded that political 
gerrymandering claims were not justiciable because “no judicially 
discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political 
gerrymandering claims” currently exists.272 These four, Justice Scalia, who 
penned the controlling plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, were interested in a rule similar to the one 
person, one vote rule. Four other Justices would find political 
gerrymandering claims justiciable.273 These four, Justices Stevens, Breyer, 
Souter, and Ginsburg, were comfortable articulating a standard to decide 
such claims, though they articulated three different standards among 
them.274 The ninth Justice, Justice Kennedy, agreed with the plurality that 
the plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed, but disagreed with the plurality 
that political gerrymandering claims were not justiciable.275 Justice 
Kennedy concluded that a non-justiciability determination would be 
premature because of the possibility that “some limited and precise 
rationale” might emerge that would enable courts to decide these 
disputes.276 Tempted by the allure of the one person, one vote principle, 
Justice Kennedy longed for “rules to limit and confine judicial 
intervention.”277 Reynolds nourished Justice Kennedy’s search for 
“principled, well-accepted rules of fairness” and “a manageable standard 
for assessing burdens on representational rights.”278 Justice Kennedy 
explicitly used the reapportionment cases as direct comparators.279 He 
chided the plurality of lacking the “patient approach of Baker v. Carr.”280 
Like Banquo’s ghost at Macbeth’s banquet, “one person, one vote” silently, 
accusingly, and maddeningly haunts the Court in Vieth.  
 
270.  Indeed, some Justices have recognized that malapportionment and partisan gerrymandering 
are related problems and understand the equipopulation principle as something of a limitation on 
partisan gerrymandering. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 578–79 (“indiscriminate districting . . . may 
be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering”); Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949–
50 (2004) (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (“After our recent decision in Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), the equal-population principle remains the only clear limitation on 
improper districting practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its strength.”); Samuel Issacharoff, 
Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 
1648 (1993). 
271.  541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
272.  Id. at 281. 
273.  See generally id. at 317–368. 
274.  See id. 
275.  Id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
276.  Id. at 306. 
277.  Id. at 307. 
278.  Id. at 308. 
279.  See id. at 311. 
280.  Id. 
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Or consider the campaign finance context. In Buckley v. Valeo, the 
Court addressed the constitutionality of Congress’s landmark campaign 
finance reform statute, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 
(FECA).281 FECA was a comprehensive regulatory scheme that regulated 
both the supply of campaign financing and the demand for campaign 
supply; FECA imposed monetary caps on both campaign contributions and 
campaign expenditures. The Court announced a rule-like framework in 
Buckley that has generally governed campaign finance regulations for 
almost forty years. Contribution limitations are generally permissible and 
expenditure limitations are generally unconstitutional. 
Or take section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which governs the problem 
of racial vote dilution. In 1982 Congress amended section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act to provide that “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to 
voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by 
any State in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color . . . .”282 
Subsection (b) of section 2 stated that a plaintiff makes a claim for vote 
dilution where “based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the 
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation” because of race.283 The 
Senate Judicial Committee report provided some additional guidance in the 
form of a number of “typical factors” that would indicate a violation of 
section 2. In promulgating a revised section 2, Congress opted for a 
standard (or number of standards) to determine whether section 2 is 
violated. But in Thornburg v. Gingles,284 its first case interpreting the 
revised section 2, the Court refined Congress’s approach and introduced a 
rule-like framework to ascertain racial vote dilution.285 Plaintiffs must 
establish three conditions to make out a vote dilution claim post-Gingles. 
First, they must show that the minority group is sufficiently large and 
compact to fit within a single-member district; second, they must show that 
the minority group is politically cohesive; and third, they must show that 
the majority group votes as a bloc to defeat the minority group’s candidate 
of choice.286 It is not farfetched to attribute section 2’s stunning success to 
the Court’s ability to smartly convert an amorphous set of congressional 
standards into a rule-like framework in Gingles.  
The tug between rules and standards is the second duality. Reynolds 
gave rise to (or reflected) a presumed preference for rules over standards, 
 
281.  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
282.  42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2012). 
283.  Id. § 1973(b). 
284.  478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
285.  See id. at 50–51.  
286.  See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 90–91 (1997). 
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even where rules are hard to formulate and standards are ready at hand. The 
absence of rules seems to paralyze election law, even in the presence of 
standards. One cannot help but wonder whether the Court’s election law 
jurisprudence would be more comfortable with standards had the Court 
chosen the path opened up in Baker. And one wonders whether a 
preference for standards would have led to a much more interventionist role 
for the Court in American electoral politics. 
The third duality is the race and politics divide. Election law sometimes 
struggles to understand how to characterize race-tinged political 
controversies. Sometimes election law frames these issues as racial 
problems and sometimes it frames them as ordinary conflicts of democratic 
politics. These frames matter because the framing itself can often be 
outcome-determinative. Recall here the first duality, the Court is often 
pulled between abstaining from deciding problems of democratic politics 
and believing that it is exceptionally poised to address the pathologies of 
democratic politics. This tension does not exist in the race cases. As a 
general matter, electoral disputes framed in the register of race are entitled 
to judicial attention. The only way to avoid judicial scrutiny is to frame 
them in the register of normal politics. Consider here two prominent 
examples, Whitcomb v. Chavis287 and White v. Regester.288 
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate under the 
Equal Protection Clause a multimember district in Marion County, 
Indiana.289 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the multimember district 
diluted the votes of the African American population located within the 
district.290 The Court rejected the claim and reversed the decision of the 
district court, in part because it concluded that “there is no suggestion here 
that Marion County’s multi-member district, or similar districts throughout 
the State, were conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial 
or economic discrimination.”291 Additionally, the Court noted that there is 
“nothing in the record or in the court’s findings indicating that poor 
Negroes were not allowed to register or vote, to choose the political party 
they desired to support, to participate in its affairs or to be equally 
represented on those occasions when legislative candidates were 
chosen.”292 The Court explained that the black voters lost, not because they 
were black but because they were aligned with a political party that lost 
political power as a result of a legitimate political contest in which one 
 
287.  403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
288.  412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
289.  See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 127–29.  
290.  See id. 
291.  Id. at 149. 
292.  Id. 
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party is expected to win and another is expected to lose.293 Put differently, 
these plaintiffs were legitimate political process losers and not victims of 
racial discrimination. Consequently, the Court was not interested in 
offering them any relief.294  
By contrast, in White v. Regester, the Court upheld a district court’s 
findings that multimember districts in Texas violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.295 The Court read Whitcomb to stand for the proposition that 
plaintiffs challenging multimember districts on vote dilution grounds must 
“produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to 
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the 
group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other 
residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect 
legislators of their choice.”296 The Court distinguished Whitcomb on the 
ground that the lower court in White found evidence that voters of color 
were generally excluded from the political process and suffered from a 
history of racial discrimination.297 Because the plaintiffs in White were 
successfully able to frame their claims in racial terms, they prevailed. This 
is the race versus politics duality. 
CONCLUSION 
The story of Reynolds v. Sims is generally a story of population 
equality. The case is widely considered a triumph of judicial intervention in 
the face of severe democratic pathologies. We are happy to share in the 
conventional wisdom. But we think that this is a limited view of the case 
and the revolution it spawned. Reynolds is the most important case in the 
Democracy canon. This is because after Reynolds, the Supreme Court set 
itself on a confident and assertive path through the political process, taking 
on any and all questions. More than fifty years later, we are still coming to 
terms with the full implications of that decision. 
 
293.  Id. at 153 (“The failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its populations 
emerges more as a function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes. The voting 
power of ghetto residents may have been ‘cancelled out’ as the District Court held, but this seems a 
mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls.”). 
294.  Id. at 154–55 (“The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome 
of Marion County elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its own provides 
no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where, as here, there is no indication that this segment of 
the population is being denied access to the political system.”). 
295.  White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, at 765–70 (1973). 
296.  Id. at 766. 
297.  See, e.g., id. at 768–69. 
